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The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the concept of cognitive finitude, insofar as it is 
articulated in the opening chapters of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The analysis of this 
concept involves an in-depth study of the limits of each element of human cognition, chraracterised by 
Kant as sensibility (the faculty of intuitions) and the understanding (the faculty of concepts). The limits 
which pertain to the former are formulated in the first part of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, 
the Transcendental Aesthetic. The limits which pertain to the latter are formulated in the major sections 
of the subsequent Transcendental Analytic, referred to as the Metaphysical Deduction and the 
Transcendental Deduction. Special care is paid to the Metaphysical Deduction, insofar as it is there that 
Kant argues for the necessity of conceiving of the pure concepts of the understanding as they are listed. 
Due to the extent Kant revised portions of his text in the B-Edition (published six years after the 
original), a substantial degree of comparative work is necessary, to properly explicate the nuances of 
Kant’s complex theory. Once the bulk of the exegetical labour is done and a concept of cognitive finitude 
is at hand, we will update our investigation with reference to a contemporary debate taking place 
amongst the Kantian community. This debate revolves around the terms ‘conceptualism’ and 
‘nonconceptualism’. Though the ‘first-wave’ nonconceptualist argument concerning the status of a para-
conceptual synthesis seems to have been disproved, a newer argument has been employed to insist 
upon the necessity for a nonconceptual, sensible unity. This argument trades in the currency of infinity, 
insofar as Kant seems to suggest that we are ‘given’ infinite spatio-temporal magnitudes. We reject this 







On the opening page of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, 
1787), Immanuel Kant appended a quote from the medieval philosopher and scientist Francis Bacon. 
This epigraph is Kant’s dedication to Bacon – it is taken from Bacon’s New Organon (Novum Organum 
Scientiarum, 1620) and refers to the ‘Great Instauration’, a lifelong project of Bacon’s that aimed “to 
reform natural science into practical philosophy.”1 The quote closes with the following statement of 
purpose: “each may well hope from our instauration that it claims nothing infinite, and nothing beyond 
what is mortal; for in truth it prescribes only the end of infinite errors, and this is a legitimate end” (Bii). 
For anyone that has read Kant’s magnum opus, the import of Bacon’s quote is perspicacious, for Kant’s 
domain is the finite and finitude. The subject is limited, and has access only to what its constitutive limits 
will allow. Kant conceives of his project in a juridical fashion: by deducing the transcendental conditions 
of cognition, he legislates for the proper domain of science. Thus Kant’s aspiration is to  
institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its 
groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and 
unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself (Axi-xii). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to discuss the role that finitude plays in the opening chapters 
of Kant’s Critique. Specifically, we will discuss the concept with relation to how Kant configures 
cognition. Kant relies on the term heavily, though his use is not always uniform. Most minimally, 
cognition equates to thinking. Yet we must distinguish between thinking (Denken) and cognition proper 
(Erkenntnis).2 Cognition is not a fleeting mental impression; cognition is thought in its most advanced 
and sophisticated manifestation. Cognition entails mental propositions of a determinate object: it is 
intentional, a thought of or about X. At B146, Kant states: “To think of an object and to cognise an object 
are thus not the same. For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through which an 
                                                          
1 Brett Fulkerston-Smith, ‘Francis Bacon’ in The Bloomsbury Companion to Kant, eds. Gary Banham, Dennis 
Schulting & Nigel Hems (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 124. 
2 See the entry on ‘cognition’ in Howard Caygill’s A Kant Dictionary, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 113. For 
the distinction between cognition and knowledge, see Anil Gomes, ‘Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-
Century Analytic Philosophy’ in Kant and the Philosophy of Mind, eds. Gomes & Stephenson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017), 7-8; Chong-Fuk Lau, ‘Kant’s Concept of Cognition and the Key to the Whole Secrete of 




object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition, through which it is given.” Given the 
nature of cognition, in many instances of Kant’s Critique one could substitute the term with another, 
‘experience’, and the sentence would remain intelligible. Both are grounded in the fundamental duality 
at the centre of Kant’s philosophy. On the topic of this duality, P. F. Strawson writes: 
If any item is to enter our conscious experience we must be able to classify it in some way, to recognise 
it as possessing some general characteristics. To say that we must have general concepts in order for 
empirical knowledge to be possible is just to say that we must have such recognitional abilities as these. 
No less evidently, if these abilities are ever to be exercised, we must have material on which to exercise 
them; particular instances of general concepts must be encountered in experience. The importance of 
this fundamental duality is fully recognised by Kant.3 
To paraphrase Strawson’s analysis of Kant, we can say that on the one hand the subject thinks, which is 
to say that the subject has the capacity to determine objects through the employment of concepts, and 
on the other hand the subject senses, which is to say that the subject has the capacity to receive 
intuitions through the organs of sense-experience. If the subject thinks an object presented to him 
through sense-experience, his mental activity qualifies as cognition. Given this definition, cognition is 
clearly a prerequisite for knowledge: “we can think of cognition as involving the mind’s being 
determinately related to an object… where standing in such a relation to an object is a necessary 
condition of having propositional knowledge about the object.”4 The consequences of the fundamental 
duality, established by Kant at the beginning of his Critique, will preoccupy this dissertation’s discussion 
of cognition.   
What is Finitude? 
A definition of finitude, despite the canonicity of the term, is surprisingly difficult to come across – it is 
not to be found in the Routledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (1998), the Macmillan Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy (2006), nor even in the superb Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (1999). Perhaps this 
absence means that it doesn’t really require a lengthy explanation – after all, finitude is simply the 
characteristic of being-finite. In this basic sense, one can speak intelligibly about the ‘spatial finitude’ of 
a room, or the ‘temporal finitude’ of a film’s duration, and so on. Of course, one immediately suspects 
that the being-finite of these examples is unproblematic because the capacity the attribute of finitude is 
applied to – extension and duration respectively – is well-defined, that is, specific or narrow in range. By 
contrast, the concept of human finitude heralds a host of contentious issues, insofar as the human 
                                                          
3 P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (London: Routledge, 2006), 20. 
4 Gomes, ‘Kant, the Philosophy of Mind, and Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy’, 8. 
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subject has many capacities, many powers, and most lack the descriptive simplicity that pertains to 
extension and duration. True, the physical finitude of the subject (which relates, not quite seamlessly, to 
its biological finitude) is relatively unproblematic – like my old London flat, I can readily conceive of the 
inherent limitations of size and strength that the phrase conjures up – but the ease with which I think 
the former evaporates when it comes to conceiving man’s artistic finitude, emotional finitude, or 
political finitude.  
In our case we are concerned with cognitive finitude, or the finitude of the Kantian subject’s 
capacity to think determinately. The most obvious form an analysis of cognitive finitude can take is to 
establish the limits of cognition. After all, if something is finite, this is tantamount to saying that it has 
limits. Speaking of the cognoscendi (the ground of knowledge), Descartes says if “I consider the faculty 
of understanding, I immediately recognise in me it is very small and seriously limited.”5 But what are 
limits? This is difficult to say exactly – it seems easier somehow to say what limits do: a limit restricts. 
That is, a limit is not a thing, but insofar as a limit applies to a certain thing, the limit represents the final 
point of application or extension of whatever that thing is. Perhaps most accurately, a limit establishes 
the boundary between the thing’s possibility and impossibility. G. W. F. Hegel, an heir to Kant in many 
ways, is particularly illuminating on the logical character of limits. According to him, a thing’s limit both 
separates it from other things – “the limit is the non-being of the other” – and makes it what it is – 
“through the limit something is what it is, and in the limit it has its quality.”6 That is, what Hegel makes 
apparent is that the concept of a limit has two functions: “Something limited, for Hegel, is something of 
its own in not-being-another; it is both positive and negative – a meadow as not-wood.”7 That is, on the 
one hand the limit is negative: it marks the place beyond which the thing cannot go, and thus points to 
and denies what it is not, e.g. I am limited insofar as I am not able to be a dog, or a cloud, or another 
person entirely. On the other hand, the limit is positive: it makes the thing what it is, and nothing else, 
e.g. I am limited insofar as I am restricted to being myself (Irish, male, bookish). Thus limits are two-fold: 
they restrict the possible, and exclude the impossible. Given the fundamental duality of Kant’s 
transcendental subject, we already have a good idea as to how cognition is limited: the emergence of 
cognition is restricted to the marriage of sensibility and conceptuality, and if one or both of these 
components are missing, or if both are present and yet nothing connects them, cognition is impossible. 
                                                          
5 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Michael Moriarty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 
40. 
6 G. W. F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (New York: Humanity Books, 1969), 126. 
7 Stephen Houlgate, The Opening of Hegel’s Logic (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 2006), 358n. 
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This means that in order to comprehensively grasp Kant’s concept of cognitive finitude, we will have to 
establish  
A. the limits of sensibility,  
B. the limits of the understanding 
C. the manner in which they relate to one another 
D. the result of their relation (empirically speaking) 
Plan 
With the preceding in mind, we can outline the plan for our work. First, we will develop the foundations 
of sensibility and understanding as two separate constituents of cognition – the mode and the material 
of determinate thought – and then specify each according to the laws which govern them. This initial 
approach to cognitive finitude focuses on establishing the fact of transcendental conditions as limits, 
whether sensible (space and time) or intellectual (the categories). This will involve outlining Kant’s 
arguments in the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental 
Deduction. That done, we can derive the consequences for cognition empirically speaking, which is to 
say that we will develop the role of discursivity in Kant’s conception of cognitive finitude. Once this 
process is complete, we will have a good understanding of what finitude is. Of course, that is the point 
at which we have to problematize our understanding of cognitive finitude, a task we undertake with 
reference to a contemporary debate, namely, the debate between conceptualists and 
nonconceptualists. Not only do the terms of this lively debate revolve directly around the essential 
mechanism by which discursivity functions (the inter-dependence of sensibility and understanding), but 
more intriguingly for our purposes, an argument has arisen amongst the nonconceptualist camp which, 
while emphasising strongly the discursivity of cognition, simultaneously undermines its finitude. This 
argument is encapsulated by Colin McLear’s essay ‘Two Kinds of Unity in the Critique of Pure Reason’ 
(2015). To deal with McLear’s challenge to finitude we will refer back to Henry Allison’s W. H. Walsh-
inspired concept of ‘prolepsis’, and substantiate our attendant concept of ‘a proleptic whole’ using two 
textual analyses of Kant’s use of the term ‘infinite’ in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Metaphysical 








To Kant’s mind the mistake of all past philosophers was their inability to develop a rigorous model of 
cognition with respect to experience. Each term implies the other; without an understanding of the 
structure of one, how could one understand the structure of the other? Kant writes, “no cognition in us 
precedes experience, and with experience every cognition begins” (B1). In the history of philosophy 
many claimed to know too much, developing metaphysical systems that transgressed the limits of what 
one could reasonably assert on the basis of experience, while others, more contemporaneous to Kant 
and sensitive to the sophistry of thought, claimed that certainty itself was an illusion, for experience 
never offered the universal but only the particular and contingent.8 Kant sought a way between both 
tendencies, to retain what made them intelligible while also resolving their difficulties.  
Kant understood that the content of our experience – the world we encounter – was 
conditioned by the marriage of the forms of our sensibility (space and time) with the basic concepts or 
‘categories’ which constitute our understanding. A category, to quote Lewis White Beck, is “an a priori 
concept that serves as a rule for synthesising intuitions and concepts into a complex representation of a 
phenomenal object.”9 We will develop the terms of this definition at a later stage – for now, it is enough 
to assert that human subjectivity possesses an invariant structure, and as such we can do nothing but 
experience the world in accordance with the laws of that structure. Though we do not create the world, 
we do determine how the world appears, and “consequently… we can have cognition of no object as a 
thing in itself, but only insofar as it is an object of sensible intuition, i.e. as an appearance” (Bxxv). By 
means of this logic Kant agreed with the rationalists and dogmatic metaphysicians that we are entitled 
to a kind of certainty about the world which supersedes our immediate, everyday experience of it, for 
such entitlement is substantiated by a thorough understanding of our own nature. Not surprisingly, 
many metaphysicians in the decades since the publication of the Critique have conceived of Kant’s work, 
not with Copernicus as was his wish, but in the light of Pyrrhus, the ancient Greek general made famous 
by his habit of incurring such heavy losses that even his victories seemed little better than defeat. Kant’s 
                                                          
8 “But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be deemed a defect in the science of man, I will 
venture to affirm, that ‘tis a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in which we can employ 
ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of 
the meanest artisans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any principles which are not founded 
on that authority.” David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: Penguin Books, 1985), 45. 
9 Lewis White Beck, ‘Introduction’ in The Completeness of Kant’s Table of Judgments by Klaus Reich (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1992), xiii. 
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critical project vastly diminished the field of what philosophy could reliably state to be the case, and the 
tradition’s grasp of supersensible entities or objects (like God and the soul) had to be relinquished. That 
is, alongside the empiricists and sceptics, Kant’s transcendental idealism institutionalises the principle 
that the subject is cognitively finite – what we know of the world is restricted to our capacity to 
experience it, to the world as appearance, as opposed to the ‘world’ beyond experience, the territory of 
the thing-in-itself. In order to develop the argument that will negotiate both empiricist and rationalist 
positions, Kant’s Critique begins by asking how it is possible for the rational agent to make what he calls 
synthetic a priori judgments. To grasp Kant’s model of cognition, we must start with a description of 
what this form of judgment entails. 
Synthetic A Priori Judgments 
Contained in the phrase is a two-fold distinction between, on the one hand, analytic and synthetic 
judgments, and on the other, a priori and a posteriori judgements. In the analytic judgment, the 
predicate is contained logically in the subject, as in the sentences ‘this man is mortal’, ‘the liquid is non-
solid’, or to use Kant’s favoured example, ‘all bodies are extended’. In the synthetic judgment, by 
contrast, the subject does not contain the predicate, as in the sentences ‘the man is fat’, ‘the liquid is 
hot’, or again to use Kant’s example, ‘all bodies are heavy’. According to Kant, one  
could also call the former judgments of clarification and the latter judgments of amplification, since 
through the predicate the former do not add anything to the concept of the subject… while the latter, 
on the contrary, add to the concept of the subject a predicate that was not thought in it at all. (A7/B11) 
As for the second distinction, Kant holds that the appellation a priori pertains to a judgment when that 
judgment is made without experience providing the basis for predication. That is, an a priori judgment is 
one that says ‘A is B’, without my coming to know the B-ness of A through a sensible encounter. This is 
not to say that the components of an a priori judgment can’t be empirical: ‘all bachelors are unmarried’ 
is an example of an a priori judgment. The point is that whatever the nature of the subject and 
predicate, the justification for the use of the predicate is not verified by experience. Given that the 
justification for the use of the predicate is not dependent upon the contingency of experience, a priori 
judgments are characterised by a strict necessity. Thus all analytic judgments are a priori, insofar as 
one’s knowledge that the predicate is contained in the subject does not depend on one’s experience. 
Finally, a posteriori judgments do depend upon one’s experience for their validity: to know my 
neighbour is fat, I have to see him. Distinctions grasped, all one need do now is generate their 
combinations. Synthetic a posteriori judgments are unproblematic – we only have to consider to a lesser 
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or greater extent what experience furnishes us with. Analytic a priori judgments are also readily 
intelligible – as mentioned already, every analytic judgment must be a priori insofar as the concept of 
the subject mandates, without doubt, that certain predicates must pertain. In Kant’s Prolegomena, he 
underlines the a priority of analytic judgments with reference to the principle of contradiction, for “since 
the predicate of an affirmative analytic judgment is already thought beforehand in the concept of the 
subject, it cannot be denied of that subject without contradiction” (Prol 4:267). Ultimately the 
combination that Kant wishes to substantiate becomes apparent: synthetic a priori judgments are 
propositions which do not draw the necessity of their predication from experience, and yet nevertheless 
conjoin predicates to subjects without the former being logically implied by the latter. Kant poses the 
problem of their possibility thus: “If I am to go outside the concept A in order to cognize another B as 
combined with it, what is it on which I depend and through which the synthesis becomes possible, since 
I do not have the advantage of looking around for it in the field of experience?” (A9/B13)  
Before the migraine sets in, the reader may call a halt to the process and counter Kant’s 
question with an apt one of their own, namely, why is it necessary to make sense of synthetic a priori 
judgments? Kant’s response would be to cite David Hume, the great English empiricist who interrogated 
the “connection of cause and effect” and thereby interrupted Kant’s “dogmatic slumber” (Prol 4:260). 
Consider the following as emblematic of Hume’s sceptical reasoning: 
[w]hen we infer effects from causes, we must establish the existence of these causes; which we have 
only two ways of doing, either by an immediate perception of our memory or senses, or by an inference 
from other causes; which causes again we must ascertain in the same manner, either by a present 
impression, or by an inference from their causes, and so on…10 
That is, Hume asserted that the justification for imputing a cause to an effect is sourced from our 
experience, and insofar as experience – even the collective experience of mankind, throughout history – 
is limited, it can never upgrade the status of an observed phenomenal process into a universal and 
necessary law.11 To quote Terence Penelhum, Hume’s sceptical challenge is the insight that “the 
accumulation of similar instances does not show the practice of inferring similar outcomes to be one 
                                                          
10 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 130. 
11 Insofar as he agreed with Hume, Kant writes that if one wanted to prove the universality of causation “by saying 
that experience constantly offers examples of a regularity of appearances that give sufficient occasion for 
abstracting the concept of cause from them, and thereby at the same time thought to confirm the objective 




that leads to truth.”12 Insofar as human experience trades in the currency of particular and contingent 
events (human experience is, in a word, finite), how can one know what must always be the case – e.g. 
that every event must be preceded by a cause – if one has not witnessed eternity, nor is capable of 
knowing everything at once? Therein lies the gauntlet that Kant has to pick up, and for the solution of 
which he requires an answer to the question of how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. After all, 
any claim to the universal necessity of causation, viz. any judgment that mandates one event’s 
occurrence results in the production of another event, must be of this kind.  
[I]t is wholly impossible for reason to think such a connection a priori and from concepts, because this 
connection contains necessity; and it is simply not to be seen how it could be, that because something 
is, something else necessarily must be also…” (Prol 4:257).  
Causation is not contained in the concept of an event, and yet must be predicated of all events, and thus 
must be justified beyond the remit of personal experience. If Kant can demonstrate the manner in which 
synthetic a priori judgment operates, he will demonstrate how a finite rational agent such as the human 
subject can achieve fundamental and universal knowledge. Kant affirms that only one avenue is 
available to philosophy in order to accomplish this goal, and thereby institutes his Copernican 
revolution:  
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to 
find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this 
presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the 
problems of metaphysics by assuming that the object must conform to our cognition, which would 
better agree with the possibility of an a priori cognition of them… (Bxvi)  
To put this another way, Kant’s solution is to justify synthetic a priori knowledge with reference to the 
structure of our cognition, that is, with reference to the conditions of our subjectivity which make 
experience possible in the first place. Therein arises the transcendental quality of Kant’s critical 
philosophy: “I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with 
our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori” (A11-12/B25).  
Structure of Cognition 
In deducing the conditions for the possibility of experience, Kant’s theory will outline exactly what the 
structure of our cognition is, and in following the line of his argument, we will come to a better 
understanding of the cognitive finitude that is our topic. 
                                                          




 In brief, cognition is composed of two elements, or  
two fundamental sources of the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the 
receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these 
representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the 
latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind) (A50/B74). 
That is, for Kant, cognition can be reduced to two irreducible powers of representation: sensibility and 
the understanding. From our sensibility we receive intuitions, and from our understanding we generate 
concepts. Intuitions are immediate and particular, whereas concepts are indirect and general. Intuitions 
supply the “matter for cognition from the senses,” (A86/B118) whereas concepts are the mode of 
cognition supplied by the intellect. This dual differentiation is complimented by another distinction, viz. 
the division of the status of the faculties into spontaneous and passive. The faculty of sensibility is 
passive, as intuitions are sensory data we receive in the form of a manifold, whereas the faculty of the 
understanding is spontaneous, as it constructs concepts using the manifold of intuition as its basis. 
Jonathan Bennett asserts that the understanding “enables us to organise intellectually our raw material 
by classifying, discriminating, judging, comparing…”13 Nevertheless, Kant is at pains to stress one fact 
above all: though they are separate from one another, intuitions and concepts need to accompany each 
other if we are to have an intelligible experience of any kind: “Only from their unification can cognition 
arise” (A51/B75). Intuitions and concepts must, if they are to represent meaningfully, co-operate. In a 
famous phrase, Kant asserts the requirement to co-operate thus:  
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is thus just as necessary to 
make the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e. to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its 
intuitions understandable (i.e. to bring them under concepts)” (ibid.).  
 Insofar as Kant’s goal is to explicate synthetic a priori knowledge, he must develop a theory of 
the structure of cognition, and if cognition is a composite of two elements, then it follows that he must 
develop two theories, one for each of the structures of the individual constituents of cognition. The first 
a priori structure he will theorize is that of sensibility, in the Transcendental Aesthetic. In the Aesthetic, 
Kant identifies space and time as the pure forms of sensibility, which is to say that space and time are 
the non-conceptual conditions necessary for one to have a sensible experience of any kind. Following 
the Aesthetic is what many consider to be the core of the Critique, namely, the Transcendental Analytic. 
In the Analytic Kant performs a similar operation upon the faculty of the understanding as he does to 
the faculty of sensibility in the Aesthetic: he identifies the pure structure of the understanding itself. 
                                                          
13 Jonathan Bennett, Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 53. 
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That is, in the Analytic Kant presents a lengthy and dense argument for the existence of twelve pure 
concepts or categories, which are the pillars, so to speak, of “the intellectual conditions of human 
cognition.”14 The Analytic’s argument is divided into two parts, the first of which takes place in the 
chapter named ‘On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ which we 
traditionally refer to as ‘the Metaphysical Deduction’. The second part of the argument for the existence 
of the twelve a priori categories of the understanding falls in the chapter ‘On the Deduction of the Pure 
Concepts of the Understanding’, which will be designated by the title ‘the Transcendental Deduction’.  
The consensus amongst scholars is that the Metaphysical Deduction identifies Kant’s pure 
concepts of the understanding, and the Transcendental Deduction demonstrates their objective 
validity.15 As a result of their roles and relative disparity in length (the latter is easily three times the size 
of the former), commentators tend to focus exclusively on the Transcendental Deduction. For our 
purposes, however, an understanding of the Metaphysical Deduction is just as important as the 
Transcendental. It is the Metaphysical Deduction which justifies precisely which internal functions of 
thought are to be counted as pure concepts of the understanding, viz. the laws of the intellect. Thus, it’s 
important to keep in mind that whilst the Transcendental Deduction substantiates the role of the limits 
of intellect in cognition, the Metaphysical Deduction is where those limits are first described. Technically 
speaking, if answering the question ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?’ is Kant’s aim, one 
need look no further than a combination of the Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction.16 The 
Transcendental Deduction (and to a lesser extent, the proofs of the principles of pure understanding) 
explains why this answer is correct. For now, however, we must begin with discovering the limits of the 
material of cognition, namely, the sensible conditions of space and time. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 133. 
15 Jill Buroker, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 79; Lewis White 
Beck, A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 110; Bryan 
Hall, The Arguments of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011), 60; James Van Cleve, 
Problems From Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 88. 
16 See Béatrice Longuenesse’s essay ‘Kant in a priori concepts: the metaphysical deduction of the categories’ in The 
Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). At the beginning she writes that two steps are necessary to answer this question. “The first step was the 
argument offered in the Transcendental Aesthetic,” whereas the “second main step” takes place in “Chapter One 
of the Transcendental Analytic in the Critique of Pure Reason, [where] Kant establishes a table of the categories, or 




The Transcendental Aesthetic 
Though not without its challenges, the Transcendental Aesthetic is taken to be less complex than the 
Analytic. The reason for this (relative) simplicity is, according to Kant, that insofar as “pure intuition 
contains merely the form under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of thinking 
of an object in general,” (A50-51/B75) the idea that the form under which something is intuited is 
directly relevant to sensible objects is self-evident, whereas the idea that certain concepts have a 
necessary determinate relation to sensible objects is not. I can readily conceive of the fact that space 
and time are necessary components of my encountering an object, whereas the role of pure concepts 
(like ‘negation’) in my experience of objects seems less obligatory. Kant writes 
For that objects of sensible intuition must accord with the formal conditions of sensibility that lie in the 
mind a priori is clear from the fact that otherwise they would not be objects for us; but that they must 
also accord with the conditions that the understanding requires for the synthetic unity of thinking is a 
conclusion not so easily seen (A90/B122-123). 
The variance in terminology from the Aesthetic to the Analytic reflects the difficulty of the latter: 
whereas Kant performs two kinds of deductions in the Analytic to derive the pure concepts of the 
understanding, in the Aesthetic, the majority of Kant’s argument for space and time as the conditions of 
sensible experience is accomplished by a section named the Metaphysical Exposition.  
In order to explain the structure of sensible cognition, Kant seeks to purify sensibility of every 
possible extraneous influence:  
we will… first isolate sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its 
concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second we will then detach from the latter 
everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form 
of appearances… (A22/B36)  
Here we must note a distinction, one that will prove important for our discussion later on, viz. the 
distinction between intuition and sensation. Kant’s introduction of the term at the beginning of the 
Aesthetic is somewhat nebulous: “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation,” he writes 
at A20/B34, “insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation.” Given that intuition has been just defined as 
the manner in which cognition “relates immediately to” objects (A19/B33), one must grant that this 
description of the role of sensation is extremely similar. After all, the difference between being affected 
by an object and relating immediately to an object seems almost null. This early textual similarity has an 
effect in the secondary literature, wherein the nature of the distinction is frequently made ambiguous. 
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Consider this summary proffered by A. D. Lindsay: “Kant thus takes over from the empiricists the view of 
the passivity of the mind in sensation. Sensation is the given, understanding the spontaneous element of 
knowledge. He holds that there is no knowledge without these two elements…”17 Despite this initial 
ambiguity however, as Kant proceeds he defines sensation more precisely: “I call all representations 
pure (in a transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation” (ibid.). 
From this statement, Norman Kemp-Smith draws the following helpful conclusion: “We can speak of 
pure intuitions, but not of pure sensations.”18 Sensation, it becomes clear as the Critique develops, is 
defined first as a constituent of intuition, and second as the transmitting event of an affect or internal 
perturbation. This definition of sensation is substantiated at a far later stage in the Critique, when Kant 
writes that it “refers to a subject as a modification of its state” (A320/B376), and also by a small note 
taken from his own copy of the Critique, which reads “Intuition is related to the object [Objekt], 
sensation merely to the subject.”19 We can thus confidently affirm that in Kant’s schema, while still 
belonging to the class of representation, sensation is a wholly empirical, unprocessed and indeterminate 
representation; in the words of Lucy Allais sensations “are nonintentional or nonreferential; they do not, 
themselves, present objects to the mind.”20 One could classify a sensation as pre- or sub-intuition, 
capable of only “intensive, not extensive, magnitude.”21 To use Kant’s own examples, he writes that 
“things like colours, taste, etc. are correctly considered not as qualities of things, but as mere alterations 
of our subject, which can even be different in different people” (A29/B44).   
Moving on, Kant’s intention in the Transcendental Aesthetic is to analyse intuition in isolation 
from the two kinds of content it would otherwise exhibit: its material, affective content and its 
conceptual content. The completion of this task affords one the insight that what remains is simply the 
pure form of the faculty of sensibility:  
if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as 
substance, force, divisibility, etc. as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, 
hardness, colour, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and 
form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori… as a mere form of sensibility in the mind 
(A20-21/B35). 
                                                          
17 A. D. Lindsay, Kant (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970), 66. 
18 Norman Kemp-Smith, A Commentary to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 79 
19 See standard text, p. 155. 
20 Lucy Allais, ‘Kant, Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space’ in Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 47, no. 3 (2009), 398 
21 Kemp-Smith, A Commentary, 86. 
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The elements of this pure form of sensibility, or the sensible conditions of cognition, are now defined by 
Kant as space and time.  
What are Space and Time? 
According to Kant, space is aligned with our “outer sense” whereas time is aligned with our “inner 
sense” (A22/B37). Though Kant gives an outline of the difference between the senses, his attempt is 
rather crude. Occasionally, it sounds as though he were trying say that we experience space only 
‘outside’ of us and time only ‘inside’ of us.22 Kant clearly has no mandate for such a position: not only is 
humanity embodied, such that one has an internal spatial awareness of where one’s limbs sit in relation 
to one another, but moreover, the world alters and changes before our eyes, as people are born and 
die, birds fly from one tree to another, day passes to night, etc. The point of Kant’s distribution of sense 
is not to assign different locations of implementation to space and time. Rather, this distribution of 
sense is used to draw our attention to the minimum criteria the transcendental sensible framework 
must supply in order for one to experience physical and mental objects. That is, while the need for a 
description of the sensible conditions of one’s encounter with a three-dimensional object is obvious, 
given Kant’s aim, Kant must also account for certain psychological objects that routinely emerge in one’s 
consciousness, insofar as the latter are not purely conceptual or logical but are, in a very real sense, felt 
entities that intrude upon our experience of self. Hence, intuition is an immediate and particular 
representation the object of which can be either external or internal. Though the co-operation of both 
sensible conditions is necessary for one to have an empirical intuition, Kant’s distribution of space and 
time into outer and inner sense speaks to a common-sense analysis of the nature of extra-conscious vs. 
intra-conscious experience. Consider:   
a) Outer sense: if time suddenly stopped, as though reality was a film one could pause, every discrete 
existent beyond our consciousness (e.g. a chair, a beach ball, another person, etc.) could still be said to 
exist spatially, like a statue frozen in place. “In space their form, magnitude, and relation to one another 
is determined, or determinable” (A22/B37). Were the situation reversed, however, and space ‘ceased’ in 
an analogous manner, it is not immediately apparent in what sense one could assert that each of those 
objects still existed. The chair’s three-dimensional occupation of space seems crucial to its being a chair, 
while its progression through time does not. 
                                                          
22 Especially when Kant issues statements like “Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited 
as something in us” (A22/B37). However, as I make clear, Kant clearly appreciates the fact that we intuit time 
passing in the external world, and that we intuit the spatial location of various body parts.  
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b) Inner sense: every discrete existent within our consciousness (e.g. memories, daydreams, paranoid 
delusions of voices, etc.) must occur moment by moment, in temporal succession. The degree to which 
any of these existents take place spatially is dubious. Clearly none of our examples ‘take up any room’ as 
it were, and even the delusion of hearing voices, though it might imply a logical relation of internal 
separation (another person speaking inside me to me), could not be said to be properly spatial.   
In any case, it is the combination of the two – the unified spatio-temporal framework – that is an 
irreducible transcendental condition of any intuition. Kant seeks to prove the validity of the spatio-
temporal framework’s status as the condition of sensible cognition with recourse to an argument split 
into two parts. Like the Deductions in the Analytic, Kant develops two Expositions in the B-edition: the 
Metaphysical and the Transcendental. Allison articulates the difference thus: “the task of a metaphysical 
exposition is to establish the a priori origin of a certain representation, while that of a transcendental 
exposition is to show how this representation grounds the possibility of other synthetic a priori 
knowledge.”23 That is, while both are vitally important for understanding the Critique as a whole, we 
focus our analysis on the arguments developed in the Metaphysical Exposition, for it is in this section 
that Kant outlines how and why the spatio-temporal framework is a complex of pure intuition. The 
Transcendental Exposition, on the other hand, is a platform used to make further claims, most notably 
about geometry. While Kant writes about space and time separately, the steps he takes in their 
respective Metaphysical Expositions are almost identical in either case, so we can summarise them 
together.    
Kant initially organises his Expositions by posing alternative descriptions of space and time to his 
preferred option of transcendental idealism: “Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities? 
Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they 
were not intuited[?]” (A23/B37). In short, Kant suggests that space and time could be (a) substances, (b) 
accidents, or (c) relations obtaining between real things, before submitting his own thesis. By outlining 
the alternative theses thus, not only does Kant establish a baseline from which the Metaphysical 
Expositions can progress – the point of which, again, is to argue “that our original representations of 
space and time are a priori intuitions”24 – but Kant also gestures to the famous discrepancy between G. 
                                                          
23 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 99.  
24 Buroker, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, 47. 
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W. Leibniz and Isaac Newton’s models on the nature of spatio-temporal reality.25 Though indebted to 
both, Newton’s legacy is particularly relevant to Kant’s critical project. According to Michael Friedman, 
Kant’s “concern with what he calls conditions of possibility is fundamentally shaped by the scientific 
context of the eighteenth century – the age of the triumph of Newtonianism.”26 That said, Kant did not 
uniformly accept Newton’s explanations for why certain physical theories were applicable in the first 
case. Friedman writes: “Newton’s physics was an unqualified success in both mathematical and 
empirical terms, but there remained serious conceptual problems concerning whether and how this 
brilliantly successful theory actually made rational sense.”27 The nature of spatio-temporality, for Kant, 
was one such area where Newton’s explanation required finessing. According to Newton space and time 
were universal containers of reality. He wrote that “[a]bsolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, 
and from its own nature flows equably without relation to anything external,” and similarly that 
“[a]bsolute space, in its own nature, without relation to anything external, remains always similar and 
immovable.”28 Taking the latter as indicative of Newton’s approach to both, F. S. C. Northrop writes that 
Newtonian theory… affirms that space is an infinitely extended absolute entity quite independent of 
matter, in all its essential logical and mathematical properties. Thus this absolute space would exist even 
if all matter were removed.29  
Leibniz’ views are slightly more complicated, a fact compounded by the fragmentary nature of his extant 
writings. On the subject of absolute space (“the idol of some modern Englishmen”), Leibniz wrote in a 
letter to Samuel Clarke that to “maintain… that space is a real absolute being… involves them in great 
difficulties.”30 The major difficulty that Leibniz ascribed to Newton’s conception was that it conferred 
upon space (and consequently time) the mantle of an “eternal and infinite” category.31 Insofar as infinity 
and timelessness ought to denote the proper domain of Godliness, Leibniz held that Newton’s ideas 
were forced to conflate spatio-temporality with divinity: indeed, “some have believed it to be God 
himself.”32 This cannot be, writes Leibniz, because space “consists of parts,” and God cannot be divided 
                                                          
25 Of course the substance of this debate revolves around the letters exchanged by Leibniz and Samuel Clarke, not 
Newton himself. See Roger Ariew, ed. G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke: Correspondence (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2000). 
26 Michael Friedman, Dynamics of Reason (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001), 9. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
28 Isaac Newton, Sir Isaac Netwon’s Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World 
(Volume One: The Motion of Bodies), trans. Andrew Motte, ed. Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1974), 6. 
29 F. S. C. Northrop, ‘Leibniz’s Theory of Space’ in Journal of the History of Ideas 7, no. 4 (October, 1946), 423. 





into smaller pieces.33 Hence Leibniz concludes that, “for my own opinion, I have said more than once 
that I hold space to be something purely relative, as time is,” and that it is “an order of co-existence as 
time is an order of successions.”34 What space and time are relative to are the immaterial, simple 
substances that comprise the basic units of Leibniz’s physics: “monads are the true atoms of nature, 
and, in a word, the elements of things.”35 An analysis of the intricacy of Leibnizian monadology is 
beyond my power; nevertheless, we can affirm that monads were accorded a level of (true) reality that 
everything else (everything which results from the composition of monads) were not. Nicholas Rescher 
states: “According to Leibniz, the monads do not just ‘enter into’ the composite things of this world, but 
actually constitute them” and subsequently Leibniz “treats composites or aggregates as mere 
illusions.”36 Thus, if the monads composing bodies to which space and time obtained were suddenly 
gone, extension and duration would disappear. Daniel Garber writes: “Leibniz holds space would not 
exist were there not bodies and the substances that underlie them.”37 Give this brief précis, we will 
attribute to Leibniz’s thesis of spatio-temporality the name ‘relative forces’, to denote the dependency 
which Newton’s model abstains from. As one can now hopefully see, the Newtonian and Leibnizian 
schools of thought (absolute containers vs. relative forces) occupy two positions on the metaphysics of 
space and time. Yet Kant has proffered three alternatives to his transcendental idealist position. Allison 
clarifies this discrepancy by stating the fact that Kant “effectively elides” the positions on substance and 
accident.38 That is, though “Newton denies (largely on theological grounds) that they are substances, 
asserting instead that they are accidents of God,” his description of space and time as ‘absolutes’ or 
cosmological accidents nevertheless connotes a substance, and so Kant structures his list of alternatives 
accordingly.39  
The question now is how does Kant argue for space and time as a priori intuitions, in opposition 
to Newton and Leibniz’s alternative theories? Kant’s Metaphysical Exposition presents four arguments, 
which are most usefully divided into two parts. The first part argues for the necessity of conceiving of 
space and time as a priori (and thus necessary and universal) representational conditions. The second 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Nicholas Rescher, G. W. Leibniz’s Monadology: An Edition for Students (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1991), 17. 
36 Ibid., 46. 
37 Daniel Garber, ‘Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy’ in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 303. See also Edward Khamara, ‘Leibniz’s Theory of Space: A 
Reconstruction’ in The Philosophical Quarterly 43, no. 173 (October, 1993): 472-488. 




part argues for the necessity of conceiving of space and time as pure intuitions, which is to say 
nonconceptual representational conditions. That said, we can summarise the first two arguments for the 
a priority of our sensible conditions simultaneously, because both arguments stress the same factor: 
space and time are a priori inasmuch as they are presupposed in the occurrence of every sensible event, 
whether real, imagined or otherwise. In the case of spatial relation, one could not attend to an object 
external to oneself, or in any kind of dimensional relation to another object, without the object(s) being 
given in space: “in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus not merely 
as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground” 
(A23/B38). Thus spatial receptivity cannot be acquired “from the relations of outer appearance through 
experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation” (ibid.). 
Similarly time “is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience” (A30/B46). In 
the case of temporal relations, one could not acquire the habit an ordering different times sequentially 
or ordering of different events at the same time, if time did not already precede (and constitute) one’s 
experience as such: “For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the 
representation of time did not ground them a priori” (A30/B46). Kant’s emphasis on the necessity for 
presupposing space and time in every episode of experience is further developed by his claim, more 
pertinent to space, that one could not even conceive of a situation wherein neither extension nor 
duration were factors. Thus he writes that one “can never represent that there is no space, though one 
can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the 
condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them,” (A24/B38-39) 
and similarly “one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. 
Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible” (A31/B48). According 
to Douglas Burnham and Harvey Young, Kant’s initial argument thus repudiates “an empiricist position in 
the spirit of Locke, one that maintains that our concept of space is a posteriori, derived from our 
observation of spatial relations.”40 Allison echoes Burnham and Young’s sentiment when he writes that 
the purpose of the Metaphysical Exposition’s initial argument is to reject the empiricist account:  
the claim is not simply that space must be presupposed in order to represent things as spatial, but 
rather that it must be presupposed as a condition of the possibility of the perception of the relations 
from which the empiricist account claims it is derived.41 
                                                          
40 Douglas Burnham and Harvey Young, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Edinburgh: Edinbugh University Press, 
2007), 42. 
41 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 102. 
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If one attributes to space or time the status of accidents that determine objects, Kant takes this 
attribution to entail the contingency of space or time, which in turn entails the possibility of their 
disappearance or of their not obtaining. Thus Kant precludes the possibility that the spatio-temporal 
framework is best described in accidental or relational terms, and concomitantly asserts that it must be 
a priori. At this point it will be useful to highlight Jill Buroker’s classificatory system. She writes that the 
initial argument (above) seeks to prove “that space and time are a priori in the weak sense [insofar as] 
they are not derived from the empirical data given in experience,”42 whereas this latter argument seeks 
to prove “that space and time are a priori in the strong sense [insofar as] they are necessarily features of 
experience.”43 Moreover, in accordance with Allison’s remark that Kant elides the distinction between 
substance and accident when representing Newton’s view of space and time, Kant straightforwardly 
assumes that the arguments also preclude the final alternative (pertaining to substance). In the 
‘Conclusion from these concepts’ section on time, for instance, Kant’s declares that “Time is not 
something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus 
remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them” (A32/B49) (my italics). 
Kant’s last two arguments stress the incompatibility of attributing to the spatio-temporal 
framework a conceptual component, and thereby serve to substantiate the characterisation of space 
and time as pure intuitions. Taken together, they argue for what one might dub the ‘Universal 
Dimension’ thesis. This thesis is that space and time are singular and continuous, which one cannot but 
treat as unlimited magnitudes. In the case of spatial singularity, Kant asserts that “one can only 
represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one 
and the same unique space” (A25/B39). Kant hence asserts that any part of space, any spatial locality – 
like the volume of a cone, or the room of a house – are simply parts of a total spatial continuum. “Put 
another way, any two distinct spaces are themselves spatially related.”44 This thesis again hearkens back 
to the Leibniz and Newton debate, insofar as the latter held that “space has similar topological and 
Euclidean metrical properties everywhere, it is homogenous” whereas the former found this sameness 
of space unconvincing on the basis that it violated “the Leibnizian principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles.”45 That is, Newton’s conception opposes Leibniz’s “axiom” that “nowhere…is there 
                                                          
42 Buroker, Kant’s Critique, 47. 
43 Ibid., 50. 
44 Ibid., 52. 
45 Northrop, ‘Leibniz’s Theory of Space’, 427. For an early, pre-Critical elaboration of Kant’s preference for Newton 
in this regard, see his ‘Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space’ (1768) in 
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perfect similarity.”46 Kant’s preference for a Newtonian interpretation on this count is also reflected in 
the context of time: “Different times are only parts of one and the same time” (A31/B47). The salience 
of the unitary nature of space and time is that each must be recognised as a singular, not a general, 
representation. Concepts, as we asserted earlier, are typified by their generality, as they “refer to 
something common to a number of experiences.”47 Take, for instance, the concept of ‘seat’. The 
concept is instantiated in every particular object designed to be sat upon, for every object designed to 
be sat upon simply is a seat.48 While every object called ‘seat’ meets the criteria necessary for the 
concept to be applied, the concept is not exhausted in its materialisation, it is applicable in as many 
instances as one can think of, without limit. This is the sense in which a concept is general and never 
singular, and consequently the sense which acquires for Kant’s argument its relevance, for the unitary 
nature of space and time implies that they are singular: there is only one space, and only one time. 
Allison supports this reading, though he stresses the role of logical priority in order to serve the same 
argument: “The main point is that the marks or partial concepts out of which a general concept is 
composed are logically prior to the whole. But this is not the case with space and its parts.”49 That is, a 
concept is general in the sense that it is an aggregation of the instances it applies to, it is a result. Space, 
on the other hand, precedes every local or limited area within it.   
Next, insofar as these total spatial and temporal continuums ground every experience of a 
particular space or time, Kant claims that their extension is boundless, for every part of space and every 
moment in time is surpassed by another. Space is “an infinite given magnitude,” (A25/B40) and time 
“must… be given as unlimited” (A32/B48). Kant is here again expressing the difference between an 
intuition’s singularity and a concept’s generality. Consider Kant’s assertion: 
Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set 
of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; 
but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. 
Nevertheless space [and time are each] so thought… (A25/B40). 
                                                          
Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy (1755-1770), trans. and ed. David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 361-372. 
46 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Nature Itself; or, The Inherent Force and Activity of Created Things – Confirming and Illustrating 
the Author’s Dynamics (1698)’ in G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Texts, trans. and ed. R. S. Woolhouse and Richard 
Francks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 220. 
47 Lorne Falkenstein, Kant’s Intuitionism (Toronto: University of Buffalo Press, 1995), 218. 
48 The scope of what can constitute a seat is limited for the purpose of making our point. Clearly, a seat can also be 
an object designed for another purpose than sitting, or it can be a natural object, not designed at all. 
49 Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, 110. 
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Kant’s argument is that to the degree that space and time are without boundary, this boundlessness is 
internal to each – they contain an unlimited number of parts. If one thinks about a space adjacent to 
another space, this situation is tantamount to saying that a larger space is portioned into two. By 
contrast a concept cannot contain an infinite number of parts, i.e. significations, for the whole could not 
be apprehended and no meaning would be conveyed. As Sebastian Gardner says, such a concept “would 
be one with an infinitely rich content, and could not be grasped by the finite mind.”50  
The Ideality of Space and Time 
The purpose of the Metaphysical Exposition in the Aesthetic should now be clear: Kant demonstrates 
that space and time are the transcendental conditions of our sensibility by arguing that space and time 
are a priori, and that they are (non-conceptual) intuitions. Described alternately in the words of Graham 
Bird, the Metaphysical Exposition classifies space and time “as underivable from empirical experience” 
and “as particulars whose provenance attaches them to sense and not understanding.”51 Space and time 
contribute to the cognitive finitude of the Kantian subject because they delineate its possibility and 
impossibility. Just as one of the subsets from each of the four major classes of the categories must be 
present in order for the rational subject to have a cognition, so too must the pure manifold of space and 
time. 
Finally, as opposed to the Newtonian and Leibnizian conceptions of spatio-temporality, Kant 
affirms that space and time, as a priori intuitions, are empirically real but transcendentally ideal 
(A28/B44, A35-36/B52). By the former, Kant means to say our every sensuous intuition of an object is 
fundamentally constituted within the co-ordinates of a spatio-temporal framework. Space and time are 
ineliminable aspects of our intuiting the given – they are, in fact, the very basis of the given itself. Hence 
Kant issues emphatic assertions like: “since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given 
to us in experience that would not belong under the condition of time” (A35/B52) and “Our expositions 
accordingly teach the reality (i.e. objective validity) of space in regard to everything that can come 
before us externally as an object” (A28/B44). In the Transcendental Aesthetic, to repeat the point, Kant 
takes it that he has demonstrated the necessity of space and time as components of sensibility, which is 
the very bedrock stratum of our experience, and thus in turn, the pure ground upon which we will build 
                                                          
50 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, 2000), 79. 
51 Graham Bird, Revolutionary Kant (Illinois: Carus Publishing Company, 2006), 157. 
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our concepts. That is, according to Kant, space and time are the minimum resource that thought needs 
to think. 
 At the same time, we must realise that in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant has established the 
first beachhead on the battleground of idealism. That is to say, and going back to the latter phrase we 
highlighted above, Kant’s doctrine is committed to the view that space and time are nothing in 
themselves, without relation to the human subject: 
We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we 
depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that 
through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all 
(A27/B43). 
If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing 
with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in 
themselves, then time is nothing… Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) 
intuition (which is always sensible, i.e. insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the 
subject, is nothing (A34-35/B51). 
[Space and time] apply to objects only so far as they are considered as appearances, but do not present 
things in themselves. Those alone are the field of their validity, beyond which no further objective use of 
them takes place (A39/B56). 
The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself not an object, but the merely formal condition 
of one (as appearance), like pure space and pure time, which are to be sure something, as the forms for 
intuiting, but are not in themselves objects… (A291/B348). 
Hence time and space exist only insofar as we do – they exist, that is, for us. Though our capacity to 
intuit is restricted to the form of a spatio-temporal manifold, space and time are in turn restricted to the 
field of our transcendental subjectivity. They are no more and no less than the sensible form of our 
cognitive finitude. This aspect of Kant’s theory of sensible cognition will have important consequences 
later on, when we consider what lies beyond the conditions of our perception. But now we turn to the 
Metaphysical Deduction and the second, intellectual component of Kant’s cognitive finitude.   
Part III 
The First Step of the Metaphysical Deduction 
In short, the aim of the Metaphysical Deduction is to derive the pure concepts of the understanding 
from a table of the irreducible logical functions which govern judgment. In order to achieve this aim, 
Kant first argues for his table of logical functions, then demonstrates how they lead to the pure 
concepts. Following the pattern he initiated in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant equates the a priori 
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structure of intellectual cognition with the “form of the understanding” (A70/B95). To commence an 
investigation of the form of the understanding, all relation to empirical qualia must be removed:  
we abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e.g. from the 
influence of the senses… because these merely concern the understanding under certain circumstances 
of its application, and experience is required in order to know these (A53/B77). 
That said, insofar as the understanding can relate to the a priori manifold of sensibility one must 
stipulate the need to exorcise all trace of object-hood; whether one is speaking empirically (of the object 
itself) or transcendentally (of the conditions of the object), Kant’s concern is “with the form of the 
activity of discursive thinking regardless of the object to which it may apply.”52 In his own words, Kant’s 
goal is to examine the intellectual component of cognition “merely in respect of the laws according to 
which the understanding brings [representations] into relation to one another when it thinks, and 
therefore it deals only with the form of the understanding” (A56/B80). The central terms that Kant will 
rely upon to compose his discussion of the form of the understanding are concept, function and 
judgment.  
We have already stated that Kant held the concept to be the basic unit of the understanding. 
Again, as stated, concepts are opposed to intuitions. Whereas cognition through intuitions is immediate, 
particular, and affective, cognition through concepts is mediate, general and discursive. Buroker 
highlights the etymology of the latter term: “In describing these acts as ‘discursive’, Kant recalls the Latin 
discursus, which means ‘running through’.”53 As such, whenever one cognises through concepts, one 
employs a representation which is “always related to some other representation” (A68/B93). Given the 
nature of concepts then, cognition has to employ them in a specific manner; if they cannot relate to 
anything directly in experience (unlike intuitions, they can only relate to other representations), they 
must abide by a certain order. The procedure or rule by means of which a concept is ordered is called a 
function: “By a function… I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations 
under a common one” (ibid.). Given that a concept abides by certain functions in order to be employed, 
it still remains to be said what the consequence of that employment is. The answer, of course, is 
judgment: “the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means 
of them” (ibid.). That is, while the concept is the primary unit of the understanding, a concept cannot 
exist without the traction of other representations to ground it. “His point is that concepts have no use 
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other than to think of something, an x, as a thing of a certain kind F.”54 To state the same idea more 
succinctly: a concept only comes into existence if a judgment exercises it.55 Kant’s position therefore is 
that the minimal exercise of the understanding, and indeed, the minimal exercise of thought, is 
judgment. “We can… trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the 
understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. For according to what has been 
said above it is a faculty of thinking” (A69/B94).  
 Kant asserts that the understanding is conceptual and discursive, and its fundamental mode of 
expression is predication in judgment. Predication necessitates unity between representations, 
determined by a particular function: “All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our 
representations” (ibid.). Now, insofar as our current aim – to discover the form of the understanding by 
divorcing it from all extraneous content – means eradicating from the understanding any trace of an 
object (empirical or a priori), Kant states that the achievement of our goal consists in isolating the most 
basic functions of judgment. If one can determine which functions of judgment are minimally required 
(the simplest functions), the result is a collection of the fundamental logical operations by means of 
which representations can be unified in thought. That is, the resultant table would reflect the basic 
structure of judgment, or the basic structure of thinking, with the proviso being that no relation to 
object-hood is implied. One considers only the necessary relations between basic thought-types, 
relations which “consist in subsuming individuals under concepts, and subordinating lower (less general) 
concepts under higher (more general) concepts.”56 By using the terms ‘first-order concepts’ and 
‘second-order concepts’ to denote concepts and basic judgment-functions respectively, Buroker 
provides a useful sketch of Kant’s argument, legitimating the place of the logical functions:  
Since the first-order concepts are diverse representations, in order to combine them into a judgment, 
the understanding must employ second-order concepts. These higher-order concepts express the 
various ways to combine first-order concepts (and other representations, including judgments) to 
produce judgments of any form. Thus the pure concepts identified here are second-order concepts of 
the syntactical properties of judgments, which express the logical operations of the understanding.57  
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At this stage, thinks Kant, we are in luck: he dismisses the need to perform a laborious excavation of the 
basic functions of judgment in the Critique, because the philosophical labour required to produce such a 
collection has already been done. One need look no further than the discipline of general logic. 
General Logic 
What does Kant mean by general logic, a topic he lectured widely upon for the entirety of his career? At 
A54/B78 Kant writes that “general logic… abstracts from all contents of the cognition of the 
understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of 
thinking.” At A60/B84 he states: “General logic analyses the entire formal business of the 
understanding… into its elements, and presents these as principles of all logical assessment of our 
cognition.” Perhaps the most useful description comes at A55/B79: “General logic abstracts… from all 
content of cognition, i.e. from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the 
relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. the form of thinking in general.” The last is useful because one 
can break it down into three separate assertions, each of which explains a key aspect of the logic that is 
Kant’s focus: this logic is general because it lacks any reference to “all content of cognition”, it is pure 
because it rejects “any relation of it to the object,” and it is formal because it “considers only the logical 
form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. the form of thinking in general.”  
That said, and as in other sections, Kant further develops his position “by exclusion or 
negation.”58 In this case Kant distinguishes between pure logic, which “has to do with strictly a priori 
principles and is a canon of the understanding and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their 
use,” and applied logic, which “is directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the 
subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us” (A53/B77). This distinction further serves to 
excise from the form of the understanding any extraneous material: having barred the involvement of 
empirical and a priori sensibility, Kant now emphasises that the content of conscious, psychological 
states is also incidental. Kant was always keen to make this point. In the Vienna Logic, for instance, Kant 
dismisses applied logic explicitly, though using different terms – there he distinguishes between logica 
naturalis and logica artificialis. For Kant, “only logica artificialis is ever called logic,”59 as the concern of 
logica naturalis is with the vicissitudes of empirical consciousness, such that “there would arise from this 
a science of how we think under various hindrances, not of how we ought to think.”60 This is not to say, 
                                                          





however, that Kant classifies applied logic or logica naturalis as an unfit discipline for thought: in later 
lectures, Kant again stresses that applied logic “really ought not to be called logic,” but admits freely 
that, insofar as it describes psychological interferences in the lawful use of our understanding, we can 
learn “what one ought to do in order to make correct use of the understanding under various subjective 
obstacles and restrictions.”61 While Kant’s distinction between pure and applied logic is practical insofar 
as it contributes to explaining the purity of the former, it has its downsides. One could argue that it 
skirts redundancy inasmuch as sensible inner sense, “by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its 
inner state,” (A22/B37) includes objects of the psychological variety, e.g. memories, emotions, fantasies, 
and daydreams. Thus Kant purifies logic of this kind of representation twice. More importantly however, 
Kant’s distinction can be misleading. Having been briefed of Kant’s distinction, one is inclined to strictly 
divorce the psychological from the logical. Albeit understandable, this inclination must be checked. One 
must remember that Kant conceives of logic in its entirety (pure and applied) as “the science of the rules 
of understanding in general” (A52/B76), and pure logic is the science of the rules of thought in general. 
The minimal exercise of thought is judgment, hence pure logic provides the rules for ordering 
representations within and between judgments, insofar as the latter is “the mediate cognition of an 
object, hence the representation of a representation of it” (A68/B93). Thus, Kant’s logic pertains to the 
rules for making inferences and for co-ordinating concepts in thought; the activity of thinking is what is 
at stake. If, from a modern point of view, one is tempted to classify the study of the ordering of one’s 
mental representations as belonging to psychology rather than logic, beware. This is not Kant’s 
understanding of the distinction. Kant’s logic is hence “more psychological” than one might expect.62  
As for the tradition that Kant inherits, though Kant references him most vividly in the context of 
the lineage of the categories, Aristotle is the key influence – according to Paton, Kant “accepted 
Aristotelian logic as, within its own sphere, complete and final.”63 In the Vienna Logic, Kant accords to 
Aristotle the status of the tradition’s progenitor: “Aristotle can be regarded as the father of logic… All 
our logical terminology is from him.”64 In the Critique he writes that  
since the time of Aristotle [logic] has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the 
abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation, which 
improvements belong more to the elegance than to the security of that science (Bviii). 
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According to Aristotle’s account, the fundamental logical types can be enumerated thus: “Of things said 
without any combination, each signifies either substance or quantity or qualification or a relative or 
where or when or being-in-a-position or having or doing or being-affected.”65 Paul Studtmann repeats 
the list of categories, updating the language and providing a helpful example for each. 
According to Aristotle, words signify the following basic types: (1) a substance, like a man; (2) a quantity, 
like a line two cubits long; (3) a quality, like the white; (4) a relation, like the double; (5) somewhere, like 
in the Lyceum; (6) at some time, like yesterday; (7) being in a position, like lies; (8) having, like is shod; 
(9) acting, like cuts; or (10) being acted upon, like is cut.66 
As to the method by which Aristotle accomplished his ten-fold division, Kant refers to it as a “mechanical 
procedure,” (A66/B91) claiming that Aristotle “rounded them up as he stumbled on them” (A81/B107). 
This characterisation is inaccurate: most commentators take the view that each Aristotelian category 
represents an answer to the most basic and irreducible questions one could ask about the world as 
such.67 In contrast to this alleged “rhapsody,” Kant claims that his insight into the nature of thought qua 
judgment equipped him with an organising principle: 
I cast about for an act of the understanding… that differentiates itself only through various modifications 
or moments in order to bring the multiplicity of representation under the unity of thinking in general; 
and there I found that this act of the understanding consists in judging (Prol 4:323). 
Finally, if we follow the guidelines set forth in general logic “we find that the function of thinking in that 
can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments” (A70/B95) (my 
italics). Thus the four major classes of function are Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality. Within the 
first class, functions can be Universal, Particular or Singular. Within Quality, functions can be Affirmative, 
Negative or Infinite. Within the class of Relation, functions can be Categorical, Hypothetical or 
Disjunctive. And in the last, functions can be Problematic, Assertoric or Apodictic.  
Let’s spend a moment unpacking these classes, to get a sense of what Kant is talking about. 
Apropos Quantity, what is at stake is the degree of the extension of the subject: Universal judgments 
pertain to every case, Particular judgments pertain to some cases, and Singular judgments pertain to this 
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case. The class of Quality is best characterised by the first two functions falling under it: a judgment is 
Affirmative if it claims a state of affairs is the case, or Negative if it claims a state of affairs is not. As for 
an Infinite judgment, more will be said on this below. For the moment, we can say that it expresses 
something negative but does so in the form of affirmation, and thereby describes its subject in an open-
ended fashion, e.g. ‘the beverage is non-alcoholic’. As Bennett says, the subject of an Infinite judgment 
“is not assigned to any class but is merely excluded from one and so left, as it were, wandering in the 
infinite range of alternative possibilities.”68 The class of Relation makes sense of the consequences of 
combination amongst propositions. The simplest type – whereby the judgment doesn’t participate as 
part of a larger semantic whole – is Categorical judgment, which mandates that the predicate inheres in 
the subject (S is P). The other two pertain to complex combination: a Hypothetical judgment mandates 
that one proposition entails another (if A, then B), whereas a Disjunctive judgment mandates that one 
proposition excludes another (either A or B). Apropos Modality, Kant states that “the modality of 
judgments… concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general” (A74/B100). Thus 
by Problematic Kant is referring to judgments which communicate possibility (an example: ‘tomorrow 
might be warm’), by Assertoric he means judgments that communicate certainty (‘today is cold’) and by 
Apodictic he means judgments that communicate necessity (‘tomorrow must be the day after today’).  
To return to the main substance of our discussion, we must note that this table of logical 
functions represents a significant contribution to the being-finite of our cognition. That is, this table 
institutes the presence of twelve limits to purely conceptual, merely formal judgment. Not only do these 
functions exhaust the full range of the form of judgment (nothing more than or outside of them is 
permitted), but they are, within their respective classes, mutually exclusive. Hence one cannot describe 
the same judgment as both problematic and apodictic – one must choose between the alternatives. 
Thus Kant has provided us with the first step on the road to intellectual cognitive finitude, namely the 
limits of thought. That said, this component is not sufficient to explain cognitive finitude as such, insofar 
as cognition involves a determinate relation to an object that it thinks.  
How Does The Table Measure Up? 
Returning to the table of logical functions, what are we to make of it? Given our brief rundown, it is 
clear that Kant’s approach is substantially different from the one which results in Aristotle’s Categories – 
Kant’s table obeys the spirit of Aristotle’s ten-fold division, but not the letter. This development is 
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unsurprising when taken with Kant’s further claim about the logic of his day: it may not have taken a 
step back, he wrote, but critically it “has also been unable to take step forward” (Bviii). Hence, while the 
identity of terms (specifically Quantity, Quality and Relation) suggests close alignment with Aristotle’s 
school of thought, this identity is merely superficial: as Gilbert Ryle demonstrates, though the terms are 
the same, their meanings are completely different. Take Quality for instance: “in Aristotle’s use ‘green’, 
‘sweet’ and ‘honest’ signify qualities, but in Kant’s use ‘Quality’ signifies a proposition’s being affirmative 
or negative.”69 Or Relation: these “are in Aristotle’s use such predicates as ‘cousin of’, ‘above’, ‘bigger 
than’, but in Kant’s theory they are what are expressed by such conjunctions as ‘if’, ‘or’ and (he should 
have added) ‘and’.”70  
Ancient Greek philosophy aside, a consensus view on the validity of the table of logical functions 
does not exist. Perhaps the most obvious criticism levelled at Kant’s table is that it is antiquated, even 
obsolete, when compared with “the modern, post-Fregean logic that has replaced the logic that was 
generally accepted in Kant’s time.”71 To explore how Kant’s table becomes controversial through a 
comparison with the developments of modern logic, we will turn to P. F. Strawson. According to Henry 
Allison, Strawson is a perfect “spokesperson” for the view that “Kant’s project… is regarded as an 
obvious non-starter when viewed in the light of modern truth-functional and predicate logic.”72 Béatrice 
Longuenesse likewise holds that “Strawson rejects Kant’s table” in the name of “modern logic, in which 
the form refers to the logical constants and the rules of composition and derivation adopted in a given 
calculus.”73 In brief, Strawson makes two arguments in The Bounds of Sense that directly pertain to his 
knowledge of modern logic.74 First, he asserts that almost any collection of axioms providing the 
foundations of a logical calculus are a matter of choice rather than necessity:  
as far as logical forms are concerned, the logician’s choice of primitives is a choice… [In modern logic] it 
is a matter of choice whether we introduce the existential quantifier without a formal definition and 
define the universal quantifier in terms of it, or vice versa.75 
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The validity of Strawson’s argument is borne out by one glaring omission, mentioned in a quote earlier 
by Ryle. Nor is Ryle the only one to notice: “Today we are struck by the absence of conjunction,” writes 
Jill Buroker, “so in this respect Kant’s table seems incomplete.”76 That is, insofar as Kant makes room for 
Hypothetical (if,… then) and Disjunctive (either… or) judgments, by what right does he neglect to include 
Conjunctive (… and … ) judgments from the same class? Clearly, no such justification exists. Kant’s 
omission substantiates Strawson’s point that the selection of primitive functions will include (and 
exclude) contingent elements.  
 The Englishman nevertheless admits that the idea “that there is some set of fundamental 
notions which must be represented in one way or another in anything we could properly recognise as a 
comprehensive and adequate logic of statements” is still valid.77 Notice that Strawson refers to 
‘fundamental notions’, and not fundamental forms. Insofar as the concept of a logical ‘form’ is more 
determinate or complex than the concept of a logical ‘notion’, we are to understand that Strawson is 
only willing to entertain a search for primitives of an exceedingly general kind – a generality of greater 
magnitude, to be sure, than the generality of Kant’s logical functions. Turning to modern logic, Strawson 
posits that two such fundamental notions are “first, the idea of truth-functional composition in general; 
second, the general idea of quantification.”78 That is, the first logical primitive pertains to “the notion of 
a proposition as something which is true or false but not both,” whereas the second logical primitive 
pertains to the notion that quantity-values – such as some, all, each, one, few, etc. – must be expressible 
in any proposition.79 Granted that these two logical notions are fundamental and “underived,”80 
Strawson flags the fact that their exceeding generality renders them inoperative for the purposes of 
deducing pure concepts, which is precisely how Kant intends to employ his logical functions. Consider 
what the co-operation of these fundamental notions guarantee: “something which is essentially 
determinable as true or false and which essentially involves the introduction of general concepts and 
their application to specified or identified instances.”81 That is, Strawson contends that the co-operation 
of truth-functional composition and quantification guarantees only what he terms a “formally atomic 
proposition,” or “a singular subject-predicate proposition,”82 of the kind ‘This A is B’. Now, the 
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Metaphysical Deduction matters only insofar as the table of logical functions leads one to posit the 
conditions under which each form is necessarily applied to experience, these conditions being Kant’s all-
important twelve categories. To clarify Strawson’s point, one must emphasise that the step from logical 
function to category entails asking what kind of world must it be, such that each of the logical forms can 
find traction in empirical judgments dealing with objects of experience. For instance, Kant claims that 
the universality of causal law is the only answer to the question: what must be true of the world, such 
that Hypothetical judgments can be intelligibly stated about objects of experience? However, if one 
begins with Strawson’s fundamental notions, or their co-operation in the formally atomic proposition, 
the same step entails asking the following question: what kind of world must it be, “if we are to make 
empirical judgments, determinable as true or false, in which we predicate concepts of identified objects 
of reference?”83 Therein lies the problem. According to Strawson, when one correctly conceptualises the 
fundamental units of general logic, the question entailed by the step from general logic to 
transcendental conditions of experience (or the work done thus far) has contributed nothing to the 
debate. That is, bringing us to the moment where we can ask “What in general must be true of a world 
of objects of which we make such judgments”84 as formally atomic propositions, amounts to no more 
than asking how are synthetic a priori judgments possible. After all, if the latter are possible, the 
certainty of my judgments about empirical states of affairs is guaranteed. Hence Strawson contends that 
“[t]he excursion through the forms of logic has not advanced us a single step.”85 
 Strawson’s arguments are persuasive, and especially the second – for as he admits himself, the 
notion that some kind of basic logical structure exists is surely feasible. The problem, from our modern 
point of view, is that such a structure is far too general to effect Kant’s deduction of the categories. That 
said, Strawson’s criticism of Kant’s position is susceptible to counter-argument. One such counter-
argument would be to characterise Strawson’s criticism as a denial of the viability of Kant’s theory 
merely on the grounds of present-day scientific or mathematical standards. To the extent that such 
criticism is predicated upon a blind appeal to the authority of modern theory, it would be toothless – 
one cannot simply dismiss a previous theoretical paradigm (e.g. Newtonian physics) on the basis that a 
new one (e.g. Einstein’s relativistic physics) has emerged. Not only does such an approach ignore the 
obvious fact of historical continuity, whereby those paradigms which dominate the field today have 
been made possible only by advancements in the past, but moreover it fails to engage with the historical 






text itself, on its own terms, and thereby fails to provide a thorough critique of the arguments which the 
past author employs. Strawson surmounts this kind of counter-argument: his criticism functions by 
isolating relevant new developments in the discipline of logic and then integrating them into the aims 
and structure of Kant’s text. Insofar as he seeks to judge the merits of an up-to-date Kantianism, his 
criticism is a success. The second kind of counter-argument, however, is more compelling. It pertains to 
the point we made above about the distinction between psychology and logic. Allison and Longuenesse 
both employ the counter-argument that Strawson, blinded by a continuity in terminology, succumbs to 
the lure of anachronism. According to Allison, “it must be insisted that the modern conception of logical 
form cannot be seen simply as a replacement for the Kantian conception and, therefore, cannot be 
appealed to in order to undermine the feasibility of Kant’s own project.”86 The problem with Strawson’s 
strategy of replacement – or in my words, integration – is explained thus: “Kant’s notion of logical form 
is not that of modern logic… for Kant ‘logical form’ means something different, namely the universal 
rules of discursive thought.”87 It was precisely in relation to Kant’s focus on the human activity of 
thought (in the context of Aristotelian subject-predicate logic) that Frege criticised him:  
Kant, according to Frege, is confused in maintaining that logic deals with the rules we (human beings) 
follow in thinking, rather than with the laws that connect thoughts independently of the way any 
particular thinker or group of thinkers actually think.88  
Thus, in the eyes of Allison and Longuenesse both, Strawson misconstrues the object of Kant’s logic by 
interpreting it through the perspective of the object of modern logic, and thereby creates a false 
equivalence. According to their counter-argument, Kant’s general logic is concerned with the 
constitutive functions (activities of unification) which determine our ability to make judgments, and not 
– as is the case with Strawson’s post-Fregean modern logic – with the “structural features of the 
proposition that are relevant to truth-preserving inference and are expressed in the language of a logical 
calculus.”89 To furnish this point with the authority of a disinterested party, we turn to J. M. Bochenski’s 
account in Modern Logic – A Survey (1981). Bochenski differentiates modern logic from previous formal 
logics (such as Scholastic and Aristotelian) by drawing attention to three key methodological principles 
which “ML took over from mathematics.”90 The first pertains to modern logic’s status as a symbolic 
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logic: “ML employs artificial expressions and builds up its own languages with syntactical rules laid down 
by the logician for this purpose.”91 The second pertains to modern logic’s status as formalistic: “the 
formalistic method is one the rules of which refer exclusively to the graphic shape of tokens, and not to 
be the meaning of the terms used. Thus ‘formalism’ and ‘calculus’ are synonymous.”92 Lastly, and most 
importantly for our purposes, the third component crucial to modern logic is that it is objective: “We 
mean by that that ML disregards completely the subjective factors, such as thinking, judging, subjective 
concept-building and so on, with which most other types of logic are replete.”93 Indeed, it’s as though he 
were actively trying to vouch for Allison and Longuenesse’s counter-argument, as Bochenksi is 
particularly concerned to emphasise this last point:  
This must be well understood. A modern logician is no more dispensed from thinking and judging than is 
an astronomer or a botanist. But ML has as little to do with the private acts of the logician as astronomy 
has to do with the mental processes of the astronomer and botany with the feelings of the botanist.94 
Therefore the distinction which substantiates Longuenesse and Allison’s claim – namely that “Kant’s 
primary focus is on the forms of judging as a mental activity rather than on the forms of the judgments 
resulting from this activity”95 – is a coherent counter-argument to Strawson’s modern-logic critique of 
Kant. 
The Second Step of the Metaphysical Deduction 
Unfortunately, Kant does not render a particularly sophisticated argument for the most important step 
in his Metaphysical Deduction, namely, the derivation of the categories from the twelve logical functions 
of judgment. This is undoubtedly the most significant factor contributing to the criticism the MD 
consistently attracts. To my mind, part of the problem is expectation: given that Kant refers to “the 
metaphysical deduction [whereby] the origin of the a priori categories in general was established” 
(B159), one naturally assumes that Kant will present an argument that demonstrates that the existence 
of the categories follows necessarily from the existence of the logical functions. This is not the case. Kant 
should have stuck to using his original term Leitfaden, variously described as ‘clue’ or ‘guiding thread’ in 
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English. This is precisely what Kant wants to do: to draw us into conceiving of the categories, in a style 
more associative than apodictic.96  
The important point to keep in mind in the transition from the logical functions of judgment to 
the pure concepts of the understanding is that which we have stressed time and again: the functions do 
not pertain to objects of any kind, whether empirical or pure. These functions are, to borrow a term 
from Hegel, wholly immanent to thought. They determine the form of thought for itself: “Formal logic 
supplies us, as it were, with the complete theory of the general forms of thought.”97 In the Preface, Kant 
writes that “in logic, therefore, the understanding has to do with nothing further than itself and its own 
form” (Bix). If one considers judgments determined by the logical functions alone, the results are by 
definition without content, or empty. They relate to nothing in particular; they are “undetermined with 
respect to every object” (Prol 4:323). Yet Kant’s concern is not with judgments which pertain to nothing 
in particular; his concern is with judgments that pertain to objective states of affairs, and more broadly, 
with the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. Remember: if the concept of synthetic a priori 
judgment is intelligible, it mandates that one is capable of having knowledge, whereby the basis of such 
knowledge does not come directly from (within) experience. Hence, insofar as Kant wants to explain the 
possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, Kant has to demonstrate the validity of a system of logic 
whereby certain a priori rules of the understanding provide the conditions under which the objects of 
one’s experience are determined. Therein lies Kant’s Copernican revolution, and the reason for Kant’s 
turn from general to transcendental logic. Strawson puts it thus:  
Logic offers us analytic truths about the logical relations between… forms, tells us, e.g. that if a 
judgment of one form is true, then a related judgment of another form must be true (or false). But it 
tells us nothing about the conditions under which individual judgments of different forms are empirically 
true, true of objects of experience.98 
 To ask ‘how can the basic functions be said to have a real use?’ is tantamount to asking ‘how can 
the pure forms of the understanding relate to the objects of our experience?’ Kant begins with the 
latter, in order to come to a thesis on the former. He reminds us of the fact that the Transcendental 
Aesthetic furnishes us with a pure manifold of sensibility, composed of space and time (A77/B102). This 
is the sensible (non-conceptual) condition of our cognition. Now, given that sensibility is essentially 
                                                          
96 In fact, and in rather comic fashion, Kant himself stipulates that insofar as what is special about the categories “is 
precisely that they are related to their objects without having borrowed anything from experience for their 
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passive and the understanding is essentially spontaneous, Kant affirms that the understanding must act 
upon the manifold, in order to generate cognitions from it: “Only the spontaneity of our thought 
requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way for a 
cognition to be made out of it” (A77/B102). Kant names ‘synthesis’ the process or event by which the 
understanding achieves a collaboration with sensibility:  
By synthesis in the most general sense… I understand the action of putting different representations 
together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. Such a synthesis is 
pure if the manifold is given not empirically but a priori (as is that in space and time) (A77/B103). 
Synthesis is the key to formulating the conditions under which an object is cognisable. Prior to any 
empirical use of our faculties, prior “to all analysis of our representations,” the understanding must 
synthesise the pure manifold, for it is “the synthesis alone… which properly collects the elements for 
cognitions and unifies them into a certain content” (A77-78/B103). Now Kant makes two important 
claims. First, he aligns synthesis with the imagination (A78/B103). Second, he names the rule which 
governs the synthesis enacted by the understanding upon the pure manifold: “pure synthesis, generally 
represented, yields the pure concept of the understanding… Under this concept, therefore, the 
synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary” (A78/B104). Thus, Kant claims that before “[d]ifferent 
representations are brought under one concept analytically (a business treated by general logic),” the 
pure manifold of sensibility must be synthesised, for only then can representations be organised on the 
basis of this “necessary synthetic unity” (A79/B104).    
 Now Kant introduces the central argument of his ‘guiding thread’: 
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives unity to the 
mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure 
concept of the understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very 
same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the 
analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representation by means of the synthetic 
unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the 
understanding that pertain to objects a priori... (A79/B104-105) (my italics). 
Thus, Kant correlates the unity of representations within a judgment (brought about by one of the basic 
functions) with the unity that must exist in the manifold of sensibility before one can have a 
representation of any kind. To anticipate somewhat the substance of the conceptualist position we will 
explore later on, we can see here the germ of John McDowell’s Sellarsian reading of “ostensible seeing,” 
insofar as the basic manoeuvres of judgment are supplied by the same function that orders experience. 
That is, “logical form is present in both judgment and intuition due to the intellectual or conceptual 
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activity of the subject.”99 This is why “there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding… 
as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is 
completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured by these functions” (A79/B105). It is worth 
stressing that how the understanding “brings its transcendental content into its representation” (i.e. 
synthesis) is not explained in the MD. Kant’s claim is simply that such content must be transacted, for 
otherwise our understanding could not communicate with the pure manifold of sensibility, and thus 
nothing could arise for the subject to think logically. The rules which govern the ways in which these 
transactions take place are the pure concepts of the understanding. Given their isomorphism with the 
logical functions, the table of categories breaks down into four identical classes; their difference from 
the former table is spelled out in the subgroups. Under Quantity, there is Unity, Plurality and Totality; 
under Quality, there is Reality, Negation and Limitation; under Relation there is Inherence-Subsistence, 
Causality-Dependence, and Community; and finally under Modality, we have Possibility/Impossibility, 
Existence/Non-Existence, and Necessity/Contingency. 
 In conclusion, Kant uses the logical limits of thought – the basic functions – to lead us to a 
tabulation of the transcendental limits of cognition, namely, the pure concepts of the understanding. 
The former pertain to thought’s internal relations, while the latter pertain to thought’s necessary and 
determinate relation with an object. Though Kant’s argument is light on detail, the pivot from logical 
functions to pure concepts “consists in showing that conceptual contents for judgments about objects of 
experience are provided only if categories guide the ordering of our representations of those objects so 
that we can form concepts of them.”100 Thus the Metaphysical Deduction provides the second 
component of Kant’s model of cognitive finitude, namely, the limits of the intellect.   
Part IV 
How the Limits of Cognition Relate 
Now that we have passed through the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Metaphysical Deduction, we 
can grasp the major elements of Kant’s model of cognitive finitude: the sensible conditions which 
constitute the pure manifold of intuition, and the intellectual conditions which constitute the rules by 
which the manifold is synthesised into objects of experience. Given the roles attributed to the 
components of cognition thus far, one can conceive of human cognition as a two-storey building. At the 
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top is the understanding, the source of “the spontaneity of cognition,” (A51/B75) which is the faculty 
“for thinking,” (ibid.) “for judging” (A69/B94) and, we just saw, the faculty of synthesis too. Beneath the 
understanding is sensibility, which provides a stable basis for the faculty above. Sensibility is 
characterised by “receptivity… to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way” 
(A51/B75). The understanding shapes sensibility, and sensibility offers the understanding its material to 
shape. The next component of the model of cognitive finitude we have to explore is the manner in 
which the constituents of cognition are connected. Thanks to our exegesis of the MD, we understand 
that ‘synthesis’ stands at the heart of this connection. The next section will develop the role of synthesis 
in the Transcendental Deduction.  
The Transcendental Deduction 
It is uncontroversial to say that the Transcendental Deduction is the most important part of the Critique. 
No less than James Van Cleve, Jill Vance Buroker, Dieter Henrich and Patricia Kitcher have all explicitly 
defined it as the ‘heart’ of Kant’s magnum opus.101 Its significance lies in the fact that it is here that Kant 
demonstrates why one is obligated to conceive of the objects of experience as transcendentally 
determined by the pure concepts of the understanding. That is, rather than using the logical functions of 
judgment to establish the number and type of pure concepts which constitute the intellectual conditions 
of cognition, in the Transcendental Deduction Kant sets out to prove why the pure concepts must apply 
to experience. That this is Kant’s goal would alone justify the amount of scholarship devoted to the 
Transcendental Deduction – however, the fact that Kant entirely re-wrote the TD from the first edition 
in 1781, to the next in 1787, increases the levels of scrutiny and interpretation that Kant’s all-important 
section attracts amongst the commentariat tenfold. Given that the material is substantially different 
from one edition to the next, and insofar as the changes do not benefit the text with an enormous 
increase in clarity, most outlines – including our own – attempt to sketch the arguments of both 
sections, for elements can be found in both which assist in understanding Kant’s highly convoluted and 
dense reasoning.  
 Why do we need a transcendental deduction in the first place? Kant wishes to put our mind at 
rest on this issue immediately, in the introductory passages that presage the split between A and B-
version deductions. In order to prove the worth of most concepts, an empirical deduction is required, 
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which “shows how a concept is acquired through experience and… therefore concerns not the 
lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen” (A85/B117). Kant refers to concepts “such 
as fortune and fate” as being usurped of their proper place due to the fact that they “circulate with 
almost universal indulgence,” (A84/B117) and the implication is that if one were to deduce their 
meanings empirically, by tracing their use through history, and by contrasting different uses of these 
terms in the present, one could return some sense to them by demonstrating their origins and scope. 
However, certain concepts cannot be investigated on the basis of the same criteria, “since proofs from 
experience are not sufficient for the lawfulness of such a use,” (A85/B117) by which Kant means the 
pure concepts of the understanding. These concepts are a priori and synthetic; their role is that they 
determine objects of experience as such, and thus to conduct a test of their validity requires a different 
kind of deduction: “I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a 
priori their transcendental deduction” (ibid.). Indeed, Kant is at pains to stress the difficulty that such a 
deduction entails, as opposed to its empirical correspondent. The reader of the Critique must 
“understand from the outset its inevitable difficulty, so that he will not complain of obscurity where the 
subject-matter itself is deeply veiled…” (A88/B121). The nature of the transcendental deduction, and the 
reason it entails such complexity, is to establish by means of reasoning alone the fact that certain pure 
concepts – which have no original connection to sensibility – nevertheless determine every intuition we 
receive, and insofar as they do so, they determine every instance of experience we count as ours. In 
Kant’s own word, the TD’s challenge is to reveal “how subjective conditions of thinking should have 
objective validity, i.e. yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects” (A89-90/B122).  
The A-Edition 
The A-edition of the Transcendental Deduction is widely pilloried amongst Kantian scholars: “Everyone 
agrees that the 1781 proof fails miserably.”102 It seems especially guilty of that Strawsonian bugbear, the 
subject of speculative psychology: after rehearsing some of Kant’s conclusions in the A edition, the 
Englishman writes that it “is useless to puzzle over the status of these propositions. They belong neither 
to empirical (including physiological) psychology nor to an analytical philosophy of mind… They belong 
to the imaginary subject of transcendental psychology, a part of the Kantian model.”103 Moreover, the 
thread of the argument can often become tangled. Kemp-Smith, following in the footsteps of Hans 
Vaihinger, attributes the lack of coherency of the A-edition to its being pieced together by Kant using 
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materials from post- and pre-Critical stages of his intellectual development, and thereby resulting in a 
contradictory chimera of deductive reasoning.104 That said, the A-edition Deduction contains passages 
wherein some of Kant’s key concepts are given their first expression. Specifically, the A-edition is 
important for generating two new ideas: first, Kant conceptualises the imagination as a faculty that 
synthesises the manifold of intuition, and second, Kant conceptualises the remit of the basic and 
fundamental principle of selfhood, which he names the transcendental unity of apperception. The 
development of these concepts, and the context within which they make sense, will orient our 
discussion of the A-edition Deduction. In a manner of speaking, these theoretical entities correspond 
respectively to the “two sides” (Axvi) of the deduction, which Kant references in the Preface to the 
Critique. “One side refers to the objects of the pure understanding, and is supposed to demonstrate and 
make comprehensible the objective validity of its concepts a priori,” he writes, whereas the “other side 
deals with the pure understanding itself, concerning its possibility and the powers of cognition on which 
it itself rests; thus it considers it in a subjective relation” (Axvi-xvii). This correspondence is only 
approximate however, as Kant’s project in the TD is demonstrate the objective validity of the categories 
with respect to their synthetic-guidance procedures, such that the distinction itself is rather amorphous. 
 Kant begins with the following insight: “if one wants to know how pure concepts of the 
understanding are possible, one must inquire what are the a priori conditions on which the possibility of 
experience depends” (A95-96). Considering specifically perceptual experience, Kant now stresses its 
continuity: it is typified by connectedness, coherence and progression. Our reliance on the internal 
harmony of the manifold of intuition is so great that its presence is simply taken for granted. If the 
understanding is to determine experience, one must find a way to explain this endless and continuous 
inter-connectivity of conscious life: in a word, one must find a way to explain the unity of experience. 
Kant declaims that if “every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were 
isolated and separated from it, then there would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of 
compared and connected representations” (A97). Kant underlines this holistic interpretation of 
experience on multiple occasions, for instance:  
There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike 
connection, just as there is only one space and time, in which all forms of appearance and all relation of 
being or non-being take place. If one speaks of different experiences, they are only so many perceptions 
insofar as they belong to one and the same universal experience (A111). 
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Without unity, an experience could not take place for us. That is the central premise of the 
Transcendental Deduction. In order to begin to explain the coherency of experience, Kant directs our 
attention to the “synopsis of sense,” (A 97) namely, the manner in which our intuition is unified in 
experience. Of course space and time have already been identified as the sensible conditions of 
experience, but here Kant’s focus is on empirical intuition. Kant’s theory is that this internal harmony is 
effected through the activity of “three subjective sources of cognition,” (ibid.) alternatively referred to 
as the Threefold Synthesis. 
 The Threefold Synthesis is one of the most memorable aspects of Kant’s A-edition Deduction. 
Before we sketch its particular functions, let’s remind ourselves of what synthesis is. Consider Kant’s 
basic definition, which remains unchanged from the first edition to the second: “By synthesis in the most 
general sense… I understand the action of putting different representations together with each other 
and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition.” (A77/B103) That said, the Threefold Synthesis 
entails – predictably – three moments, which one can either interpret as three separate stages of a 
sequence of cognitive syntheses, or else as the same cognitive synthesis but understood in three 
complimentary senses. More will be said on this soon – for now, let’s just try to understand what Kant 
wants to say. These moments are named apprehension, reproduction and recognition. Kant introduces 
them with reference to the concept of spontaneity: “This is now the ground of the threefold synthesis, 
which is necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension of representations, as 
modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them in the imagination; and of their 
recognition in the concept” (A97). The first synthesis relates to what one might call the local unity of the 
manifold of intuition. Apprehension’s synthetic activity is what allows one to grasp the perceptual field 
as a coherent whole, populated by discrete units arranged into their proper perspectival relations, as 
opposed to the chaotic flux of raw sensory impressions that Kant implies would otherwise result: “in 
order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is 
necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness” (A99). The second synthesis 
permits one to carry one manifold into the next, creating a timeline or continuous sensory context 
through the imagination’s reproduction of past representations. If the second synthesis were not to 
function, I would “lose the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the preceding parts of 
time, or the successively represented units) from my thoughts,” and the coherency of my first-order 
manifold wholes would be in jeopardy, producing inconsistent representations such as Kant’s famous 
description of cinnabar “now red, now black, now light, now heavy…” (A101). The final synthesis is 
recognition, and it serves to crystallise the unity of the manifold under a concept. That is, the synthesis 
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of recognition catalyses experience insofar as it legitimates the other two syntheses by completing their 
orientation toward an object with the concept of that object, and thus fully individuating that object as 
the object it is. Kant immediately relates this recognitional activity with ‘consciousness’ – “it is this one 
consciousness that unifies the manifold that has been successively intuited, and then also reproduced, 
into one representation” (A103). For Kant the use of concepts to determine objects in one’s manifold is 
tantamount to being conscious of the object, and if the experience of that object is unified – which it has 
to be, in order to be an experience at all – this implies or presupposes the unity of consciousness. This 
unity of consciousness which is presupposed by the experience of a unified manifold is alternatively 
referred to as ‘apperception’.105 Thus, the final synthesis involves two strains of combination: while 
experience can only take place in the context of a unified consciousness, the objectivity of the 
experience is also completed with reference to a concept, insofar as the concept acts as a guide, serving 
“as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances” (A106).  
There you have Kant’s Threefold Synthesis. Prima facie one understands quite well what Kant is 
aiming at. He identifies the fact that our sensible experience – the manifold of intuition – is continuous 
and interconnected in multiple ways, and he attributes the various types of unity to the effects of 
specific cognitive capacities, which is to say that an element of conceptuality regulates the subject’s 
sensible experience. The syntheses of apprehension and reproduction focus heavily on the unity of the 
manifold of intuition, whereas the synthesis of apperception explains that the unity provided for by 
sense and imagination in turn relies on a unity of conceptual consciousness. Kant is attempting to 
demonstrate that any experience, no matter what kind of status it has as an immediate sensory input, is 
oriented by processes originating in the understanding. This strategy is typical of regressive 
transcendental arguments. According to Sebastian Gardner, such an argument proceeds as follows:  
starting from the fact that we commonsensically conceive the empirical world in such and such terms, 
and then inferring, on the basis of his assumption that the proper explanation of our fundamental 
conceptualisation of the world has Copernican grounds, what set of concepts we employ for this 
purpose, and what transcendental functions they serve.106 
Thus Kant’s argument for the Threefold Synthesis is regressive, insofar as he begins with the unity of 
sensible experience, and argues henceforth for the necessity of three cognitive syntheses.  
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 But that is not all. Kant now attempts to develop an aspect of the third synthesis, namely the 
unity of apperception. As he develops the role of apperception, the oneness of consciousness, Kant 
begins to move into deeper levels of abstraction, to substantiate this unity. He starts with a general 
statement: “Every necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground” (A106). Insofar as 
apperception, or the unity of consciousness, is the ultimate necessary component for one to have a 
possessed, conceptual experience, apperception must also be accompanied by a transcendental ground.  
A transcendental ground must therefore be found for the unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of 
the manifold of all our intuitions, hence also of concepts of objects in general, consequently also of all 
objects of experience… (ibid.).  
Thus Kant introduces his concept of the subject’s transcendental unity of apperception: 
Now no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them, without that unity of 
consciousness that precedes all data of the intuitions, and in relation to which all representation of 
objects is alone possible. This pure, original, unchanging consciousness I will now name transcendental 
apperception (A107). 
This stage of the argument (A106-109) is both pivotal for understanding the A-edition Deduction, and 
undoubtedly confused. What’s important to keep in mind is that Kant thinks that the unity of 
consciousness provides him with a bridge from the synthesised manifold of sensibility to the pure 
concepts of the understanding. Insofar as it is this bridge, the unity of consciousness must pertain to a 
more originary level of cognitive activity than was described in the third synthesis of recognition. In 
order to fully develop the unity of consciousness into the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant 
takes a step back and to the side (as it were), and approaches the topic from another angle. His starting 
point is the concept of self-consciousness. The concept of self-consciousness and its emergence in Kant’s 
argument is partly where the confusion lies – the concept is not argued for, but assumed from the fact 
of consciousness, and whats worse, Kant does not use it consistently, but switches between 
consciousness and self-consciousness without regard for their distinction. He introduces the concept 
with reference to empirical consciousness: “The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the 
determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical… [it] is customarily called inner 
sense or empirical apperception” (A107). To be fair to Kant, to be conscious of an object is to be 
conscious of something that is external to oneself – thus, in any exercise of object-oriented 
consciousness, a self-consciousness is semantically implicit. That said, the empirical self-consciousness 
he brings our attention to has merely to do with our perception of our inner states – our empirical self-
consciousness is sensational, intensive, changing from one moment to the next. For Kant, empirical 
apperception is “forever variable, it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner 
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appearances” (ibid.). Thus, in empirical apperception, one is a subject that treats its self as an object 
which varies, corresponding to the external objects distinct from itself, which in turn change as my 
awareness shifts from one to the next. In all of this, Kant’s point is that it is difficult to understand how 
one stable consciousness can be said to emerge, which is to say that the unity posited earlier seems 
unlikely to be the result of an empirical apperception that changes all the time, as the empirical self-
consciousness varies in response to the changing manifold of intuition. Thus, in order to account for the 
stability of our self-consciousness, Kant proposes the presence of the transcendental unity of 
apperception, which is ‘pure, original, unchanging’ self-consciousness. This is a sheer “numerical unity” 
(ibid.) or strict self-identity, stripped of any content. It is the pure and empty form of transcendental 
subjectivity, the “sole source of all unity.”107  
With the transcendental unity of apperception to hand, Kant will now bring in the pure concepts 
of the understanding. Kant’s argument is, in short, that due to the emptiness of the identity of the 
transcendental unity of apperception, upon which all syntheses are grounded, the pure and originary 
identical I must be accompanied by laws of the understanding: “this transcendental unity of 
apperception, however, makes out of all possible appearances that can ever come together in one 
experience a connection of all of these representations in accordance with laws” (A108). Kant does not 
argue for how this accompaniment is supposed to take place, but simply that it must take place. It must 
take place, because if the laws of the understanding did not provide “the function by means of which 
this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition,” the transcendental unity of apperception 
could not itself arise: “the unity of consciousness would be impossible” (ibid.). This is a complex 
argument, so we have to watch it carefully. First of all, the law – which Kant calls here a function – does 
not enact synthesis (it is not a faculty); it is the rule according to which all syntheses must take place. 
Kant writes then that “the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same 
time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance 
with concepts, i.e., in accordance with rules” (ibid.): this is to say that if we accept the presence of the 
transcendental unity of apperception – if that concept is coherent – we must also accept the presence of 
rules or ‘concepts’ which guide the operation of our syntheses. Kant writes:  
for the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, 
and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects all 
synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, and first makes possible their 
connection in accordance with a priori rules (ibid.). 
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If we did not possess certain a priori rules by which to organise syntheses, syntheses would be 
impossible, and they would not take place. With respect to the transcendental unity of apperception, 
Kant’s point seems to be that whilst the pure and original self-consciousness is a transcendental 
condition of experience (insofar as it precedes experience, and provides the stable basis from which all 
cognitive syntheses take place), it does not ‘contain’ rules for ordering experience a priori. It is simply a 
brute fact of our mental constitution, the empty I that is identical with itself. In order for any experience 
to be an experience, certain rules which dictate the forms of syntheses that can occur, and which in turn 
organise experience into a coherent unity, must be in place a priori. If not, even the transcendental unity 
of apperception would be insufficient for experience to arise. These rules, functions, laws or concepts (a 
multiplicity of terms which compounds the reader’s confusion) can be nothing other than the categories 
of the understanding. 
 Before we move forward, a note of caution. I have presented the argument as best as I can, but 
Kant’s writing is haphazard, and there are some who would disagree with this interpretation. One such 
person is Norman Kemp-Smith. According to Kemp-Smith, the rules, functions, laws or concepts, which I 
have equated with the categories, are not pure but only empirical. I cannot see why Kemp-Smith holds 
this view, especially in light of the fact that he immediately criticises Kant on the basis of the 
unintelligibility of this interpretation. That is, Kemp-Smith writes that “Such a view of the function of 
general concepts renders unintelligible their own first formation. For as they are empirical, they can only 
be acquired by conscious processes that do not involve them.”108 That is, Kemp-Smith correctly 
identifies the fact that if one attributed the organisation of a priori syntheses to empirical concepts, one 
falls foul of contradiction: “How through a consciousness that is not yet unified can general concepts be 
formed?”109 To our mind Kant does not fall into this trap, for he is conscious of the argument that Kemp-
Smith employs to criticise him. And to be fair to Kant, though his pleonasm is the root and cause of all 
misinterpretation, the synonyms he uses are explicitly tied to the pure use of the understanding. 
‘Function’ (Funktion) carries connotations of the logical functions of the understanding, and in the rare 
instance that Kant employs the term otherwise, it is used in the sense that it stands apart from, rather 
than being generated by, sensible experience: e.g. when Kant is discussing the obstacle presented by 
common-sense to his theory of intellectual conditions, he claims that “The categories of the 
understanding… do not represent to us the conditions under which objects are given in intuition at all, 
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hence objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the 
understanding” (A89/B122); and far later in the text, in the context of schematism, he writes that “the 
category contains the function, unrestricted by any sensible condition, of their unity, as of a synthesis in 
general” (A181/B224). ‘Law’ (Gesetz) is also a term that rarely conveys an empirical origin. At A110, Kant 
refers to “the transcendental law that all appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through 
them, must stand…,” at A111 he refers to “universal and necessary laws,” and at A113 he speaks of the 
“law of nature” and “constant laws.” And finally, whatever one might think of law and function, Kant’s 
use of the term “a priori rules,” (A108, A110) should be enough to lay Kemp-Smith’s doubt to rest. 
 Thus, though the path is beset on all sides by an absence of rigorous argumentation, the general 
outline of Kant’s argument should be clear. First, he asserts that the central defining tenet of experience 
is its unity. Second, he explains that this unity can only be the result of cognitive syntheses, the last and 
highest-functioning of which is the subject’s capacity to synthesise the manifold of intuition through a 
conceptual consciousness. Third, the presence of conceptual consciousness in turn implies that the 
rational agent possesses at least an empirical self-consciousness. Fourth, insofar as empirical self-
consciousness and consciousness of objects external to oneself could never result in a stable, 
unchanging self-consciousness, we have to attribute to the latter a transcendental ground, namely the 
transcendental unity of apperception. Fifth and finally, though the transcendental unity of apperception 
is absolutely fundamental, it is empty; thus, we must assign to the laws that govern the syntheses which 
determine our experience a transcendental content also, and these are precisely the categories of the 
understanding.    
The B-Edition 
Ever since Dieter Henrich’s seminal paper ‘The Proof-Structure of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction’ 
(1969), the dominant trend within Kantian scholarship has centred around some variation of Henrich’s 
‘two-step proof’ model to explain Kant’s procedure in the B-edition Transcendental Deduction. Henrich’s 
interpretation was motivated by the seeming similarity of two conclusions reached in the development 
of the B Deduction: the first comes at the end of section 20, stipulating that “the manifold in a given 
intuition also necessarily stands under categories” (B143); the second comes at the end of section 26, 
whereby Kant concludes that “all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, 
stands under the categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the 
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience…” (B161). Given that a superficial comparison 
of these two conclusions yields little difference, Henrich held that many have been “tempted to see two 
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proofs of the same proposition in the text of the second edition.”110 Such a temptation must be avoided 
however, otherwise one transgresses against Kant’s explicit instruction to conceive of the arguments as 
separate, and sequentially dependent. At B144-145, Kant refers to the conclusion of section 20 as “the 
beginning of a deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding.” This beginning is in turn 
completed in 
the sequel (§26) [where] it will be shown from the way in which the empirical intuition is given in 
sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold of a 
given intuition in general... 
Consequently Henrich developed an interpretation to demonstrate that “sections 20 and 26 offer two 
arguments with significantly different results, and that these together yield a single proof of the 
Transcendental Deduction. We shall call this task the problem of the two-steps-in-one-proof.”111 The 
distinction that galvanised Henrich’s ‘two-step proof’ applies to the unity of intuition: according to 
Henrich, the “result of the proof in section 20 is… valid only for those intuitions which already contain 
unity,” whereas “the second part of the Deduction will show that the categories are valid for all objects 
of our senses.”112 That is, the first part of the B Deduction functions as proof that unified intuitions are 
subject to the categories, whereas the second part functions as proof that every representation, without 
exception, is subject to the categories, therefore demonstrating “the unrestricted validity of the 
categories for everything which can be meaningfully related to experience.”113 
 That Henrich’s paper is canonical for its advancement of the ‘two-step proof’ model is assured, 
however the substance of the distinction that motivates the interpretation is still very open to debate. 
According to Allison, Henrich’s interpretation is vulnerable to two criticisms. On the one hand, Henrich’s 
distinction seems to operate on the distinctly problematic assumption that intuitions can possess unity 
before their determination by the understanding. And on the other hand, the sequence of Henrich’s 
‘two-step’ model is “counter-intuitive,” insofar as Kant “clearly states that the first part is concerned 
with the relation between the categories and the manifold of sensible intuition in general and the 
second with their relation to objects of human sensible intuition.”114 Hence the order of Henrich’s 
arguments, ranging from the narrow application of the categories to the broad, is in direct contrast with 
Kant’s own statements. As a result Allison develops his own ‘two-step proof’ model, which follows the 
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form of Henrich’s interpretation but not the substance. According to Allison the conclusion of section 20 
pertains to the role that the categories play “as rules for the thought of an object of sensible intuition in 
general, that is, as discursive rules for judgment,” whereas the aim behind the culmination of section 26 
is “to link the categories (albeit indirectly) to the perception rather than merely the thought of 
objects.”115 Alternatively put,   
[the first] step attempts to demonstrate the objective validity of the categories, to show that they are 
required for thinking about objects. The second step argues that the categories apply necessarily to 
objects of experience, and thus has objective reality.116 
Apart from the fact that Allison’s interpretation circumvents the issues one can find in Henrich’s model, 
his version of the two-step proof is beneficial for two reasons. First, it is simple. Simplicity which does 
come at the cost of conceptual rigour is a sought-after quality when considering scholars’ explanations 
for what Kant wrote and why. Second, it delivers a sense of continuity within the progression of the 
Critique that is often lacking, for according to the substance of Allison’s distinction, Kant’s first step is 
comparable to a re-elaboration of the arguments made by the Metaphysical Deduction and A-edition 
Transcendental Deduction together, though notably in reverse order. Remember: in the Metaphysical 
Deduction Kant sought to outline the logical functions of judgment – the fundamental operations of 
abstract thought – to guide us in our understanding of the nature and number of the categories. The 
logical functions were conceived apart “from all content of cognition, i.e. from any relation… to the 
object,” such that they represent “only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e. 
the form of thinking in general” (A55/B79). Then in the A-edition Transcendental Deduction, one of the 
central concepts Kant developed was that of the transcendental unity of apperception. This unity is the 
empty and formal identical I that must underpin all empirical experience of objects, for otherwise the 
self that claims and organises its objective experiences as ‘my own’ would not exist. Allison’s 
interpretation integrates both of these arguments into the first step of the B-edition Deduction, and in 
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The First Step: §15-20 
Kant begins the B-edition TD with a summary discussion of synthesis qua combination. Whatever one 
might think of the validity of his theory, 117 Kant’s position regarding the understanding’s sole 
operational capacity for synthesis is clear:   
the combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and 
therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition; for it is an act of the 
spontaneity of the power of representation, and… one must call the latter understanding, in distinction 
from sensibility (B129-130).  
That said, the first step of the TD only really gets going in §16, with mention of the transcendental unity 
of apperception. Indeed it is here one comes across one of the most memorable passages to be found in 
the Critique: “The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something 
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the 
representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me” (B131-132). This 
sentence has stimulated much discussion about the modality of Kant’s claim, for to interpret the claim 
as being ‘the I think must always accompany all my representations’ entails further assertions about the 
nature of cognition (which are not necessarily insuperable), such as denying a contributive role to the 
unconscious in experience. After all, whatever one’s allowance is for an unconscious component in 
human cognition, the unconscious is defined by the absence of a concrete ‘I think’. That said, 
commitment to a (differently) complex theory of cognition is not necessary if one focuses on the phrase 
“must be able,” which is to say that Kant necessitates only that it must be possible for the ‘I think’ to 
accompany my representations – for if it were impossible, then ipso facto it would be “nothing for me.” 
More importantly for our purposes, Kant identifies this necessity of the possibility of an I think 
accompanying all our representations with the position of the transcendental unity of apperception, 
“because it produces the representation I think” (B132). For the remainder of §16 and the majority of 
§17 and §18, Kant cycles through an argument that we are familiar with thanks to the A-edition TD. The 
fact of empirical consciousness, which is a consciousness of the object in intuition, obliges one to 
attribute to oneself a self-consciousness, for there is no relation to external sensibility without 
presupposing what relates to external sensibility (the I). This empirical self-consciousness in turn 
presuppose a transcendental ground of the unity of this self-identity, “for otherwise I would have as 
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multi-coloured, diverse a self as I have representations of which I am conscious” (B134). Thus, from the 
“analytical unity of apperception” – by which Kant means the identity of one’s consciousness across 
different representations – we are obliged to posit the existence of “some synthetic one” (B133-134). 
The transcendental ground of the synthetic unity of apperception is thus a prerequisite not only for 
empirical self-consciousness, but empirical objective consciousness. That is, for the manifold of intuition 
to become coherent, which is to say to guarantee the possibility of its becoming an intuition per se, the 
manifold must be synthesised and thereby depends upon the transcendental unity of apperception: 
“[t[he supreme principle of all intuition in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold of 
intuition stand under conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception” (B136). Insofar as the 
synthesis of the manifold relies squarely on the transcendental unity of apperception, Kant is now 
secure to proffer a new definition of the faculty of the understanding (the seat of apperception): 
“Understanding is, generally speaking, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determinate 
relation of given representations to an object” (B137) (my italics). At this stage of the argument, it’s 
important to specify what the status of this ‘object’ of intuition is. “An object, however, is that in the 
concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” (ibid.) This (temporary) definition of the 
object is what substantiates Allison’s characterisation of the first step of his interpretation, for here Kant  
in effect defines an object as whatever is thought as a unified manifold by means of a concept. The 
object here is the object of thought; the definition establishes that it must be a complex whose parts 
(the manifold) are unified by a concept.118  
Thus Kant asserts the necessary relation between the transcendental unity of apperception, the 
manifold of intuition, and the concept of an object in that manifold, whereby the concept is the vehicle 
by which this objective thought is gathered: “The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity 
through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object” (B139). That is, 
after demonstrating that the transcendental unity of apperception is necessary to ground the synthesis 
of any representational state, whether conceptual or sensible, he states that the synthesis of the 
manifold of intuition which is necessary for the latter to produce an object of cognition involves 
concepts. “Put less technically, Kant has argued that when one unifies some manifold by means of a 
concept, one thereby renders the manifold thinkable as an object or gives it objective validity.”119 At §19 
Kant progresses significantly, moving in the direction covered by the Metaphysical Deduction: he writes 
that “a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of 
                                                          




apperception” (B141). By ‘objective unity’, Kant means the “the necessary relation of the manifold of 
intuition to the one I think… which grounds a priori the empirical synthesis” (B140). Thus Kant stipulates 
that a judgment is the articulation of the cognitive synthesis (conceptually determined intuition) in 
original apperception. That is, “synthesis is equivalent to judging; in judging one conceives a manifold as 
related in a way that can be asserted to obtain.”120 For Allison, Kant’s identification of the act of judging 
with the synthesis of the manifold under a concept (grounded by the transcendental unity of 
apperception) is greatly welcome, and clarifies retroactively portions of the B Deduction: 
In particular, it helps us to understand better Kant’s insistence not only on the necessity of a synthesis 
but also on the consciousness thereof, which seemed so puzzling when initially presented. Looking 
back… it becomes clear that the synthesis to which Kant there referred was nothing other than the act 
of judgment.”121  
Furthermore, Kant’s identification of the act of judgment with the synthesis constitutive of the cognitive 
object leads us easily into discussion of the categories at §20, for judgment “must also be viewed as 
norm governed”122 insofar as its functions determine the kind of synthesis it effects. “That action of the 
understanding… through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or 
concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments” (B143). But 
as we know from the MD, if functions determine cognition as opposed to the immanent representations 
of thought (merely formal, logical objects, without relation to sensibility), then the functions take on a 
new aspect, for “the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the 
manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them” (ibid.). Thus ends Kant’s argument for 
the necessity of conceiving of the objects of determinate thought as being conditioned by the 
categories. Before we move to the second step, it should be clear that, though the end of the first step 
of the B Deduction covers similar terrain to the MD, the result takes what the latter had merely assumed 
and devises a comprehensive argument to affirm its transcendental commitments. That is, the B 
Deduction “takes us beyond the Metaphysical Deduction by offering grounds to support what the latter 
was forced to assume, namely, that the understanding has a real (as opposed to a merely logical) use, 
through which it introduces a ‘transcendental content’ into its representations.”123 
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The Second Step: §21-26 
Now we truly move into the bedrock of Kant’s critical project. In the previous, Kant’s purpose was to 
“abstract from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to attend only 
to the unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by means of the category” (B144). 
That is, Kant’s purpose was to reveal the necessity for conceiving of the object of cognition as 
categorially conditioned. Insofar as he achieved this, Kant demonstrated that in order for us to 
determinately think an object, the object must be unified in accordance with the categories. What he 
has not demonstrated is that any object, if merely perceived, must also abide by the categories in order 
to be an object of intuition. Therefore he will now show “from the way in which the empirical intuition is 
given in sensibility that its unity can be none other than the one the category prescribes to the manifold 
of a given intuition in general” (B144-145). That is, Kant is to reveal that the object of experience - the 
spatio-temporal manifold – must also fall under the categories. 
 The development of the argument in the second step is – in one sense – simpler than the first, 
insofar as the argument is really comprised of only two sections. The first significant section is §24, 
wherein Kant discusses the role of the transcendental imagination. As we know, Kant introduced this 
concept in the Metaphysical Deduction where he described it enigmatically as “a blind though 
indispensable function of the soul” (A78/B103). Then he developed it in the A-edition TD as the second 
member of the Threefold Synthesis, which maintained constancy across a sequence of sensible 
manifolds. He also distinguished between the productive and reproductive syntheses of the imagination 
such that the former is a priori and the latter empirical (A118-121). In the A-edition, the imagination 
possesses a liminal quality; sometimes it seems to be an informal power of the mind (like memory), at 
other times it seems a faculty proper, but even when conceived in the latter sense its function is merely 
combinatory, standing on the threshold between sensibility and the understanding: “Both extremes, 
namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental 
function of the imagination” (A125). In the B Deduction, Kant employs the concept in a more surefooted 
manner: the transcendental imagination facilitates the application of the categories to the sensible 
conditions of experience, namely, space and time.  
To begin, Kant says that there are two distinct kinds of syntheses we need to be aware of. The 
first is the one covered by the first step of the B Deduction: synthesis of the manifold of intuition under 
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the direct guidance of the understanding, which Kant now calls “synthesis intellectualis” (B150).124 This 
account, though pivotal, still gives too much weight to the “mere forms of thought” and doesn’t 
sufficiently embed the categories in the constitution of our first-level experience of the manifold of 
intuition (ibid.). According to Kant then, the requisite “synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition” is 
accomplished by “the transcendental synthesis of the imagination,” which he also refers to as “the 
figurative synthesis” and “synthesis speciosa” (B151). In order to substantiate this significant theoretical 
manoeuvre, Kant introduces his newest definition of the imagination: “Imagination is the faculty for 
representing an object even without its presence in intuition” (ibid.). This definition retains some 
continuity with how Kant characterised imagination in the Threefold Synthesis, insofar as there it had a 
suturing effect, alloying absent with present stages of the manifold: preserving the past and projecting 
the present into the future. Now, Kant brings to the fore what in the A-edition TD had been implicit, 
namely, the imagination’s constitution of temporality. Time, of course, is one of the a priori forms of 
sensibility, and specifically the form of inner sense. If you cast your mind back to the Metaphysical 
Exposition of these forms, Kant insisted that time and space were singular continuums, such that every 
particular spatio-temporal perception was merely a part, a limitation, of an infinitely great tapestry, 
every moment a piece of eternity. Imagination is the key in synthesising this temporal model of 
moments-in-eternity: “in order to represent a determinate time, we must be able to represent past and 
future times that are not ‘present’ and ultimately the single time of which they are parts.”125 That is, the 
imagination as Kant conceives it has an interpretive quality, as though it possessed a logical structure 
somewhere between rational inference and visual experimentation. Indeed, Kant remarks that we 
cannot even represent time  
without, in drawing a straight line (which is to be the external figurative representation of time), 
attending merely to the action of the synthesis of the manifold through which we successively 
determine the inner sense, and thereby attending to the succession of this determination in inner sense 
(B154). 
The example of line-drawing is significant insofar as it demonstrates that one cannot directly perceive 
time, yet nor does one simply think it. For Kant the interpretive quality of the imaginative synthesis, 
which determines pieces of the temporal manifold while also projecting their extension beyond the 
immediate, is the reason it must be conceived of in terms of the categories. For the categories are the 
rules by which any spontaneous synthesis must function. Hence, and in alignment with the A-edition, 
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Kant calls the properly transcendental component of imaginative synthesis productive, insofar as it is 
spontaneous, generative and a necessary condition for what Buroker calls “global time in its entirety.”126 
Now it must be stated that, though the substance of Kant discussion is centred on time, Kant’s argument 
concerns both sensible conditions of cognition, viz. time and space – the imaginative synthesis 
discriminates amongst and projects spatial infinitude as much as it does temporal. As a result Kant 
contends that the imagination “belongs to sensibility,” insofar as it “alone… can give a corresponding 
intuition to the concepts of the understanding,” and at the same time it acts “in accordance with the 
categories” of the understanding, insofar as it spontaneously determines “the form of sense a priori in 
accordance with the unity of apperception” (B151-152).127 Ultimately, what Kant takes it that he has 
proved is that the categories are necessary constitutive rules for the unification of the a priori forms of 
intuition. 
  The second (and shorter) significant section of the B Deduction’s second movement is §26. In 
this section, Kant discusses 
the possibility of cognising a priori through categories whatever objects may come before our senses, 
not as far as the form of their intuition but rather as far as the laws of their combination are concerned, 
thus the possibility of as it were prescribing the law to nature and even making the latter possible, is to 
be explained (B159-160). 
Or to use Allison’s words: 
Although the connection of the categories with the forms of sensibility through the transcendental 
synthesis of the imagination is undoubtedly the pivotal step of the argument, it does not of itself suffice 
to secure the goal of the Deduction. This requires demonstrating that the categories stand in a 
necessary connection with empirical intuition.128 
Kant begins with what he calls “the synthesis of apprehension” (B160). This phrase has also been 
prefigured in the A-edition, though the relationship between its use there and here is not perfectly 
symmetrical. The synthesis of apprehension is “the composition of the manifold in an empirical 
intuition, through which perception, i.e. empirical consciousness of it (as in appearance), becomes 
possible” (ibid.). According to Burnham and Young, Kant’s definition of perception “is something like, 
then, the empirical consciousness that something has appeared to me,” which is reminiscent of Kant’s 
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initial claim about the ‘I think’ accompanying my representations.129 By arguing for the relevance of the 
categories upon one’s perception, Kant provides a contrast with his thesis in the Prolegomena, whereby 
he distinguishes judgments of experience from judgments of perception precisely on these grounds (Prol 
4:298).130 That said, the central argument employed by Kant about the synthesis of apprehension is that 
the rules governing its synthetic unification must be the same as those governing the synthetic 
unification by the transcendental imagination of the forms of intuition. He substantiates this correlation 
by affirming that “space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but 
also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of the unity of 
this manifold in them…” (B160). That is, Kant states that not only are space and time the forms of 
intuition, but are themselves intuitions containing a synthesised manifold, to which he gives the name 
“formal intuition,” in the infamous footnote below (B161n). His point is that, insofar as our formal 
intuitions are de facto unified, this unification is due to the processing of the categories: “But this 
synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in 
general in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our sensible 
intuition” (B161). 
 Thus comes to a close the major development of Kant’s Critique, which began with the problem 
of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments, and culminates with the B-edition Transcendental 
Deduction. Clearly the significance of Kant’s text transcends these opening chapters, but they are 
arguably the most pivotal in the context of his Critical philosophy. By the end of the Deduction, Kant’s 
theory of the sensible and intellectual conditions of the possibility of experience has been fully 
instituted. He has established the limits of cognition, and provided a deft theory, not without its 
challenges, for the intricacies of their co-operation. As for our purpose, the hardest work has been done. 
Next, we will concentrate on interrogating Kant’s achievement with reference to a debate that aims 
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We have presented the terms of Kant’s theory of cognition in the way he introduces them: as equivalent 
components of an inter-dependent discursive whole. In recent years, however, a debate has emerged 
amongst those seeking to clarify the nature of the relation of the components of cognition. The debate 
is fixed upon the problem of parity between sensible and intellectual conditions of cognition. Some have 
claimed that a substantial parity exists, with each faculty participating equally in a democratic cognitive 
process, whereas others see that claim for parity as misjudged. According to the latter school of 
thought, parity is an illusion produced by Kant’s desire for architectonic symmetry, and that by 
necessity, the sensible component of cognition is beholden to the intellectual component. According to 
the terms of the present debate, the former position is attributed to nonconceptualism whereas the 
latter is attributed to conceptualism. Insofar as the former camp initiated the debate, their basic 
argument set the terms as it stands today. The nonconceptualist position can be summarised in brief: 
according to proponents of the theory, sensibility is an autonomous faculty and the matter it contributes 
to cognition (independently of the understanding) is what they refer to as ‘nonconceptual particulars’. 
Depending on the strength of the proponent’s nonconceptualist commitment, these particulars are 
either strictly synonymous with ‘intuitions’ (strong nonconceptualism) or are substantive contributions 
to the manifold of intuition (weak nonconceptualism).131 Whatever the case, the argument is that 
sensibility provides a content for cognition “independently of our applying, or having the ability to apply, 
concepts, and in particular the categories, to these particulars…”132 Given our discussion thus far, the 
terms of this debate clearly revolve around the status of discursivity: conceptualists tend to devitalise 
the role of sensibility in our cognition, whereas the nonconceptualists tend to radically empower it.  
Lucy Allais and Robert Hanna were the original proponents of the nonconceptualist position. 
Writing papers in the mid-2000s, Hanna and Allais sought to highlight a discrepancy they noted between 
local arguments employed in the text of Kant’s Critique and the accepted interpretation of the opening 
chapters’ cumulative argument. Following quickly on their heels were scholars such as José Luis 
Bermúdez, Sacha Golob, Christopher Peacocke, Dennis Schulting, and Colin McLear, for each of whom 
the orthodox Kantian interpretation had become tiresome. Primarily, the nonconceptualists attributed 
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the legacy they sought to overcome to the writings of Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell. In the former’s 
famous John Locke Lectures of 1966, one can see the nascent stirrings of this debate:  
It is tempting to think that Kant’s distinction between the representations of the understanding and the 
representations of sensibility is essentially the same as that which many philosophers have drawn 
between conceptual and non-conceptual representations… Yet an examination of the use to which Kant 
puts his distinction soon makes it evident that while there is something to this interpretation, there is 
little which is ‘clear cut’ about the way the distinction is drawn.133 
From the perspective of Allais et al, Sellars’ conceptualist credentials are best expressed in his rejection 
of the ‘Myth of the Given’. In Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (1997), Sellars clarifies what this 
Myth consists in: 
there are various forms taken by the Myth of the Given… but they all have in common the idea that the 
awareness of certain sorts – and by ‘sorts’ I have in mind, in the first instance, determinate sense 
repeatables – is a primordial, non-problematic feature of ‘immediate experience’.134  
For James R. O’Shea, Sellars’s attack on the Myth of the Given amounts to a rebuttal of the following 
perceptual-realist argument: 
since not all of our knowledge can be derived by inference from prior knowledge ad infinitum, there 
must be some basic items of knowledge which are simply ‘given’ in roughly the sense that they are 
(allegedly) known directly or immediately without presupposing our possession of any other 
knowledge.135 
More succinctly, one can say that Sellars argued against “the idea that empirical knowledge rests on a 
‘foundation’ of non-inferential knowledge of matters of fact.”136 Sellars’ influence was (and continues to 
be) widespread.137 The impact of his writing is pervasive throughout epistemology, philosophy of mind 
and, of course, “the interpretation of Kant’s philosophy.”138 For our current purposes, the most notable 
philosopher influenced by Sellars’ approach to Kant was John McDowell. “McDowell uses the twentieth-
century Kantian Wilfrid Sellars as a guide for his reading of Kant,” and “taking his cue from Sellars, sets 
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himself against all varieties of the Myth of the Given.”139 At the beginning of Mind and World (1994) 
McDowell employs Kant’s remark at A51/B75 on the co-dependence of concepts and intuitions to lead 
“into talking about how the idea of the Given figures in a thought about the grounding that entitles 
some empirical judgments to count as knowledgeable.”140 Almost immediately, McDowell denounces 
the nonconceptual, non-inferential Given, judging that it “is useless for its purpose.”141  
Our aim is not to develop McDowell’s Sellarsian reading of the Given, but to contextualise the 
emergence of nonconceptualism. Nevertheless, two brief points can be made here. First, McDowell 
asserts that empiricist foundationalism is epistemologically unsound. In the early passages wherein he 
negotiates with the philosophy of Donald Davidson, McDowell affirms that “if we conceive experience in 
terms of impacts on sensibility that occur outside the space of concepts, we must not think we can 
appeal to experience to justify judgments or beliefs. That would be to fall into the Myth of the Given.”142 
This claim is echoed by McDowell in a later text, when he stipulates that Sellars’ “master thought” is that 
“the conceptual apparatus we employ when we place things in the logical space of reasons is irreducible 
to any conceptual apparatus that does not serve to place things in the logical space of reasons.”143 
Second, McDowell asserts that even basic episodes of perception have to be conceptually-oriented. 
Take for instance an episode of visual perception, which McDowell – following Sellars – calls ostensible 
seeing. Episodes of ostensible seeing are simply “experiences in which it looks to their subject as if 
things are a certain way.”144 An example: ‘this red cube in front of me’. According to McDowell’s reading 
of Sellars, episodes of ostensible seeing are related to the subject-predicate structure of Kantian 
judgments because they contain claims, not least insofar as a perceptual experience of a red cube is not 
a pyramid and not blue. Thus one’s everyday perceptual experience is constituted by “non-overt 
conceptual episodes.”145 It is not that McDowell wants to obliterate the distinction between two 
episodes of consciousness. No one could mistake the fact that making a judgment that things are as 
they look is not the same as perceiving that things are as they look. Rather, the Kantianism that both 
Sellars and McDowell promote is that the complexity of basic perceptual experience necessitates an 
                                                          
139 Richard J. Bernstein ‘McDowell’s Domesticated Hegelianism’ in Reading McDowell: On Mind and World 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 10-11. 
140 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 6. 
141 Ibid., 7. 
142 Ibid., 14. 
143 John McDowell, Having the World in View: Essays on Kant, Hegel and Sellars (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 4-5. 
144 Ibid., 10. 
145 Ibid., 11. 
57 
 
underlying proto-conceptual discrimination. “In visual experiences conceptual capacities are actualised 
with suitable modes of togetherness; this is how we cash out the idea that the episodes ‘contain’ 
claims.”146 According to McDowell, in order to overcome the fallacy of the Given we have to “recognise 
that the world’s impressions on our senses are already possessed of conceptual content.”147 In more 
Kantian terms, McDowell’s vision of the Critique argues “that the spontaneity of our thought must 
somehow internally be seen to be linked to our empirical experiences, as already operative in the 
deliverances of sensibility, for experience to provide justifications of our beliefs.”148 Such is the general 
trend of Kant commentary that the nonconceptualists wish to supersede. 
Nonconceptualism and Synthesis 
Pace Sellars and McDowell, “the nonconceptualist interpretation… holds that intuitions can present us 
with empirical objects without any application of concepts.”149 According to Allais et al, many of Kant’s 
primary claims regarding the nature of cognition become meaningless if the conceptualist orthodoxy is 
maintained. Lucy Allais draws our attention to various spatial claims made by Kant in the Aesthetic. 
Consider A23/B39:  
Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain 
sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e. to something in another place in space from that 
in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside and next to one another, thus 
not merely different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. 
According to Allais, the dominant reading of Kant’s model of cognition “makes it difficult to make sense 
of this claim.”150 After all, if the coherency of one’s perception (of space) is a result of the operation of 
our conceptual faculty, why does Kant stress that space is both nonconceptual and the ground of 
nonconceptual sensations? That’s not the only question Allais’ textual analysis poses to the 
conceptualist reading, which the latter seems hard-pressed to answer. She locates yield-points in the 
arguments of notable scholars Paul Abela and Sally Sedgwick, whereby the two – following in 
McDowell’s footsteps –describe Kant’s Critique as a project to disenfranchise sensible data of any 
meaningful epistemic role. Take Sedgwick for instance: “What we learn from the transcendental 
deduction is that the ‘raw’ or unsynthesised data of sensation is not a possible object of thought for us; 
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it therefore has no role to play in the justification of our empirical judgments.”151 According to Allais 
Kant’s critique of Lockean and Humean empiricism is undisputed, but it cannot be extended to 
encompass intuition per se. The true target of Kant’s anti-empiricism is what Kant calls sensations, which 
we examined in our opening exegesis of the Aesthetic. And if one accepts that there is a distinction 
between sensation and intuition, one cannot simply distinguish the latter from the former by attributing 
to intuitions a conceptual content; for “if the difference between sensations and intuitions were that 
intuitions involve concepts, then Kant would not define intuition… in opposition to concepts.”152 
Ultimately, Allais and Hanna both locate the crux of the interpretive tension in the concept of synthesis. 
The nonconceptualists concur that synthesis is required to produce the kind of coherent sensible 
representation Kant calls intuitions, but they reject the idea that all forms of synthesis are 
manifestations of the understanding’s activity, seeking instead to give some significance to the idea of a 
para-conceptual synthesis. Critically, they each stress that, given the model of the Threefold Synthesis in 
the A-edition Transcendental Deduction, only the third and final kind of synthesis (recognition) 
“explicitly involves concepts.”153 The other two syntheses (apprehension and reproduction) are 
attributed to the power of imagination, and imagination, as we stated earlier, is liminal – not quite 
under the auspices of either sensibility or understanding. For Allais this ambiguity is enough to 
undermine the certainty of conceptualists, but Hanna makes far more hay from the first two syntheses. 
He writes that sensibility is “only relatively passive, but not entirely passive… by virtue of its expressing a 
mental power for spontaneous synthesis, or mental processing,” which in turn is “said to have a single… 
innate psychological ground in the ‘transcendental’ or ‘productive’ imagination, which carries out the 
operation of ‘figurative synthesis’ or synthesis speciosa.”154 
 While Allais and Hanna’s nonconceptualist readings possess merit – especially in resisting an all-
too overt mentalist interpretation of Kant’s idealism which amounts to a conceptually monist view of 
cognition – their writing never really gains enough traction to succeed in the manner they want. Though 
they aim to separate intuition from the pure concepts of the understanding, the most they do is strictly 
enforce the difference between intuitions and empirical concepts, a difference admitted by most. 
Significantly, their reliance on the imagination to legitimate the establishment of a para-conceptual 
synthesis is overplayed. Though true that Kant at one point declares “imagination… belongs to 
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sensibility” (B151), this single episode cannot compete with the wealth of material bringing the 
imagination under the purview of the understanding. In Hannah Ginsborg’s paper ‘Was Kant a 
Nonconceptualist?’ (2008), for instance, she asks us to consider two notes, appended to A120 and B160: 
in the first Kant states that imagination “is a necessary ingredient of perception itself,” for “something 
more than the receptivity of impressions is required” to produce a unified manifold (A120n), and in the 
second Kant states that sensible unity “presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses 
but through which all the concepts of space and time become possible” (B160n). Hence Ginsborg claims 
that the imaginative synthesis is “implicated in the having of intuitions, both empirical and pure.”155 
Moreover, though Kant seems to attribute to sensibility the power of imagination at B151, he directly 
contradicts this characterisation in a lengthy ‘conceptualist’ passage: 
but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, like sense, 
merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance with the unity of 
apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a priori, and its 
synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application (and at the 
same time the ground of all others) to objects of the intuition that is possible for us (B151-152) (my 
italics). 
Indeed, this passage not only straightforwardly places the power of imagination under the 
understanding, but the reason it does so is because synthesis is spontaneous, and as we clarified in our 
discussion of the B-edition TD, one of the most – if not the most – crucial distinguishing marks 
separating sensibility and understanding is that the former is passive while the latter is spontaneous 
(read: generative). Hence the nonconceptualist idea of a para-conceptual synthesis falls flat. Finally, if 
this argument weren’t enough to convince one of the error of Allais et al’s ways, one simply can’t ignore 
the fact that even in the A-edition TD Kant explicitly ties the functioning of the transcendental 
imagination to a priori rules: “the affinity of all appearances (near or remote) is a necessary 
consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a priori on rules” (A123). Intriguingly, 
Henry Allison is sympathetic to the component of the nonconceptualist argument which strongly affirms 
the separation of the imagination from sensibility and the understanding, accusing Strawson and Sellars 
both of ‘over-intellectualising’ the Kantian imagination. According to Allison the imagination can’t even 
be described (pace Sellars) as “minimally conceptual,” but must rather be understood as “proto-
conceptual” – that is, “the imagination has the task of unifying the sensible data in a way that makes 
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possible its subsequent conceptualisation, without itself being a mode of conceptualisation.”156 
However, even with that much admitted, still Allison cannot (nor does he wish to) conceive of an 
imaginative synthesis that is not rule-governed. Following in J. Michael Young’s wake, Allison maintains 
that what separates the syntheses effected by the imagination and the syntheses effected directly by 
the understanding is “the sense that its rule-governed interpretive activity is not self-consciously 
performed, which is why it does not amount to cognition ‘in the proper sense’.”157 For Allison and Young 
that is, unlike the synthesis effected directly by the understanding, the imaginative synthesis does not 
use empirical concepts to gather intuitions into judgments. Nevertheless, the imagination’s synthesis is 
certainly guided by the demands of the pure concepts of the understanding. As we made clear earlier 
on, and as Kant will indicate in the sentences directly after his preceding quote – the understanding is 
“the faculty of rules” (A126), upon which “is grounded, therefore, all unity in the synthesis of the 
imagination” (A125) – any mention of a priori rules refers to the determining function of the categories 
of the understanding. Hence wherever synthesis occurs, whether of the imagination or otherwise, the 
categories are determinant factors.  
A New Argument (Discursivity Trumps Finitude) 
Thus, insofar as conceptually-oriented syntheses are necessary for the internal coherency of any kind of 
perceptual experience – no matter how trivial or basic – the role of the nonconceptual particular seems 
to have to come up short. Now, however, another nonconceptualist argument looms over the horizon. 
Jessica J. Williams notes:  
A growing number of interpreters, on the other hand, have appealed to Kant’s characterisation of space 
as an infinite, all-encompassing whole that precedes its parts to argue that the unity of space cannot be 
a product of categorial synthesis, which has a part-whole priority.158  
The most notable purveyor of this viewpoint is Colin McLear, whose article ‘Two Kinds of Unity in the 
Critique of Pure Reason’ (2015) is widely referenced amongst fellow nonconceptualists. It’s to his 
argument we will now turn, to develop the logic of this second nonconceptualist position. Before we 
begin, however, a reminder: Kant favours a discussion of space in the Transcendental Aesthetic as 
opposed to time, as what applies to the former applies (for the most part) to the latter. Hence while the 
ensuing discussion pertains to both, references to ‘space’ will continue to predominate.  
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 McLear levels the same criticism at the McDowellian orthodoxy as his peers, writing that one 
cannot support the conceptualist “rereading of Kant’s argument in the Transcendental Aesthetic 
without compromising central tenets of the critical philosophy.”159 Indeed McLear stresses above all 
that his intention is to defend the textual integrity of the Critique, and not, as the implication has it, to 
revise Kant’s arguments in light of movements in contemporary philosophy.160 In alignment with Allais 
and Hanna, McLear’s goal is to combat a reading of the TD which “would seem to deny the possibility of 
any objective representation without the categories.”161  To achieve his purpose, McLear opens his 
paper with an intriguing conceptual manoeuvre: he circumvents the problematic status of synthesis all 
together. He states  
we can distinguish two very general positions regarding the cognitive roles of sensibility and the 
understanding. Either sensibility, independently of any synthesis, furnishes the mind with objective 
representations (intuitions), or such objective representations depend, at least in part, on mental acts of 
synthesis.162 
‘Sensibilism’ is the name McLear gives to the position that “sensibility may furnish the mind with at least 
some unsynthesised objective representations,” whereas the second position – that “all objective 
representation requires synthesis” – is named ‘Intellectualism’.163 In supporting a Sensibilist reading of 
Kant’s Critique, McLear rejects the nonconceptualist claim to para-conceptual syntheses, but in so doing, 
he immediately provokes censure from another sector. For as we detailed above, Kant’s argument for 
the necessity of a priori syntheses is due to his understanding of the unity of experience, including the 
unity of the manifold of intuition. If McLear wishes to circumvent the problem of conceptually-oriented 
syntheses, he will have to deal with this issue. McLear’s solution is to distinguish between sensible unity 
and conceptual unity as different kinds: “I articulate two distinct ways in which a representation may 
possess unity. One is aesthetic and given via sensibility. The other is discursive and generated by the 
understanding.”164 In order to insist on this distinction, McLear brings the reader back to the Aesthetic’s 
central claims, outlined in the Metaphysical Exposition, “that space and time are a priori 
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representations. For our purposes, the interesting characteristic of these representational forms is that 
we grasp them wholly non-discursively.”165 That is, the crux of McLear’s argument rests in the fact that – 
as he sees it – Kant attributes to the pure intuitions a unity that is expressly not conceptual. Insofar as all 
syntheses are conceptually-oriented, McLear holds that space and time must possess a sensible (pre-
categorial) unity. In particular, the thesis that McLear wishes to focus on is Kant’s insistence that space 
and time are “singular and infinite given wholes.”166 If one needs reminding yet again, Kant argued that 
space and time had to be a priori intuitions because we receive them as infinite given magnitudes, which 
is to say that every ‘part’ (every moment, every place) one encounters is only a local manifestation of a 
singular, endless continuum. Arthur Collins puts it simply: “There is just one space in which all outer 
things are located.”167 
 Remember: Kant developed four arguments in the Metaphysical Exposition, two of which 
supported the claim that spatio-temporality is a priori, and the other two supported the claim that 
spatio-temporality is nonconceptual. Earlier in the text we referred to the latter as the ‘Universal 
Dimension’ thesis. Let’s remind ourselves of its arguments (focusing on the B-edition): 
The Part-Whole Argument: “one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, 
one understands by that only part of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were 
precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be 
possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is essentially single…” (A25/B39)  
The Infinite Argument: “Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, 
think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible 
representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as 
such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless space 
is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous) (A25/B39-40).” 
Though separate, these arguments are ordered such that the latter builds upon the former. According to 
McLear’s reading, the PWA states that, unlike conceptual unities which construct wholes out of parts, all 
parts of space and time are limitations on the whole (the whole pre-exists the parts). The IA states that, 
unlike conceptual infinities which consist of parts under one another, space and time are infinities which 
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contain all parts together. Thus most of the heavy lifting is done by the first argument; what the second 
argument does is amplify the consequences of the first in order to preclude the possibility that intuitions 
are the same kind of representation as concepts. That is, the PWA promotes a mereological distinction 
(it posits two underlying structural relations) between concepts and intuitions, and the IA clarifies the 
consequences of this distinction by adding infinity to it. For McLear, the combination of Kant’s 
arguments is sufficiently momentous, that not only does it amount to proof that intuitions are different 
to concepts (which almost all but the most vociferous of conceptualists would agree to), but indeed it 
amounts to proof of Kant’s commitment to there being two kinds of transcendental representational 
unity. According to McLear, after all, if one understands unity exclusively as the result of an activity of 
the intellect, one simply cannot make sense of Kant’s argument in the Metaphysical Exposition: “This 
view entails that our conception of space as an infinite whole would be logically constructed from our 
grasp of the discrete spaces composing it (whether these spaces are perceived or mathematically 
grasped).”168 To be succinct, McLear emphasises that the kind of infinity represented in spatio-
temporality (the whole, and not the sequence of parts) is incompatible with conceptual determination, 
whether pure or otherwise. Insofar as the infinite whole is given, it must then be given as a whole purely 
sensibly, without conceptual involvement. “We grasp the whole of space first, and it is in virtue of this 
that its parts, as limitations of the infinite whole, are conceptually grasped and cognized discursively.”169 
 Clearly, one way to attack McLear’s position is simply to say ‘it doesn’t work’. That is, one 
ignores the difficulties inherent in the Metaphysical Exposition in favour of the (salient) fact that Kant 
stipulates time and again that all unity is the result of a conceptually-oriented synthesis.170 But this line 
of argument, though perfectly justified, does not address McLear’s position directly. Despite the fact 
that I take it to be ultimately incoherent – there is no unity without synthesis, and no synthesis without 
concepts – his thought expresses an anxiety about the Universal Dimension thesis that one cannot deny 
to be apt, if only to the degree that it attracts confusion. What does Kant really mean by an infinite given 
magnitude? The précis we delivered in our own analysis of the Aesthetic doesn’t solve this issue, and it 
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is important, especially in light of the topic that is our theme: the nature of the cognitive finitude in the 
opening chapters of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. After all, according to McLear’s Kant we have the 
means to be given a non-intellectual infinity. In order to address this anxiety directly, the best strategy 
would be to analyse the meaning of infinity for Kant – we’ll begin with the central feature of the second 
argument (the IA) of the Universal Dimension thesis and work backwards. Once this hermeneutic has 
been accomplished, what remains ought to be easily integrated within the parameters of the B 
Deduction TD, and especially with the help of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, the 
activity of which McLear ignores completely. Normally, one associates discussions of Kant and infinity 
with the Transcendental Dialectic, and more specifically, with discussions pertaining to the First and 
Second Antinomies. However, insofar as our aim is to analyse the meaning of cognitive finitude vis-à-vis 
the opening chapters, to draw now upon the Antinomies hardly seems sporting. More importantly it is 
not necessary, for Kant employs the term ‘infinity’ in both the Aesthetic and the Metaphysical 
Deduction, and both episodes are sufficiently meaningful to indicate an interpretation of Kant that is 
charitable to his project while also meeting the anxiety expressed by McLear. Before we analyse these 
episodes, however, a critical distinction must be made.  
 The distinction that must be made pertains to the term ‘infinity’. What is it, and what does it 
mean? Few living philosophers are better able to approach an answer to that question than the Oxford 
scholar Adrian Moore. In 1990 Moore published a book on this subject, and prefaced his exegesis with 
the following: “My aim, in general terms, is to make sense of the infinite. I draw on what western 
philosophers have thought about the infinite ever since they first began to pay it attention some two 
and a half thousand years ago.”171 What follows is an in-depth historical survey of various mathematical 
and philosophical theories of the infinite, beginning with the pre-Socratics and coming to a close with 
Wittgenstein. Despite the diversity of the thinkers across the millennia, Moore identifies the fact that, 
when it comes to a definition of infinity, “[t]wo clusters of concepts nevertheless dominate.”172  
Within the first cluster we find: boundlessness; endlessness; unlimitedness; immeasurability; eternity; 
that which is such that, given any determinate part of it, there is always more to come; that which is 
greater than any assignable quantity. Within the second cluster we find: completeness; wholeness; 
unity; universality; absoluteness; perfection; self-sufficiency; autonomy. The concepts in the first cluster 
are more negative and convey a sense of potentiality… The concepts in the second cluster are more 
positive and convey a sense of actuality.173   
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Clearly Moore is drawing upon Aristotle’s discussion of potential and actual infinity to construct his 
division, demonstrating that Aristotle’s exegesis of infinity in the Physics is still deeply relevant to this 
day. As Moore writes: “Many of the concepts that have shaped and informed subsequent discussion, 
indeed much of what has actually been discussed, originated with Aristotle.”174 Nevertheless, while 
Aristotle denies actual infinity in favour of the potential, Moore does not favour one ‘constellation’ over 
another – his goal is analysis, not judgment. We can summarise the fruits of Moore’s distinction thus: on 
the one hand there is endless infinity, and on the other hand total infinity. According to Colin McLear, 
Kant’s discussion of space as an infinite given magnitude belongs to the latter, insofar as the sensible 
infinite is presented holistically:  
Kant suggests… in the above quotations from the Metaphysical Exposition, that our cognitive grasp of 
space is holistic. We grasp the whole of space first, and it is in virtue of this that its parts, as limitations 
of the infinite whole, are conceptually grasped and cognised discursively.175 
That understood, let’s now proceed to unpacking Kant’s alternate uses of the term ‘infinity’ in the 
opening chapters of the Critique. 
Infinite Judgment (the Metaphysical Deduction) 
We turn to Kant’s use of the term ‘infinity’ in the Metaphysical Deduction first, because it is less 
complicated than his contrastive use of the term in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Little has been written 
on infinite judgments, despite how intriguing Kant’s use of the adjective is. This may be because Kant 
admits that, like singular judgment under Quantity, the class of infinite judgment doesn’t strictly belong 
to general pure logic (A72/B97). That he includes them in the table nonetheless is baffling, despite the 
use to which he puts their correspondents in the categories. Of course it’s precisely in service of the 
latter that he does include them, and some commentators, like Longuenesse, charitably assent: “those 
two forms do belong in a table geared toward laying out the ways in which our understanding comes up 
with knowledge of objects.”176 Arthur Lovejoy also spends time on this subject and writes, almost 
admiringly, that “Kant is perhaps the first logician in history to conceive of a class of judgments neither 
affirmative nor negative, yet to be classified along with these by the same criterion of quality.”177 To 
explain the use of this concept, let’s follow Kant’s explanation. Considering his own example of an 
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infinite judgment, ‘the soul is non-mortal’, Kant makes two significant assertions. First, he claims that his 
proposition is affirmative insofar as it has “placed the soul within the unlimited domain [unbeschränkten 
Umfang] of undying beings” (A72/B97). Kant’s idea is that the judgment ‘the soul is non-mortal’ cleaves 
reality into two categories – the domain of mortal beings (the dying) and the domain of immortal beings 
(the undying) – and affirms that the subject belong to the latter. Kant goes on to say that  
since that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain of possible beings, but that which is 
undying the other, nothing is said by my proposition but that the soul is one of the infinite multitude 
[unendlichen Menge] of things that remain if I take away everything that is mortal (ibid.). 
Thus Kant holds that the total “infinite sphere of the possible,” which is the totality containing both 
dying and undying things, becomes “limited” by an infinite judgment “only to the extent that that which 
is mortal is separated from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining space of its domain” (A72/B97-98). 
This leads to Kant’s second significant assertion, namely, that even though one domain has been 
separated by the judgment from the infinite sphere of the possible (in Kant’s example, the domain of 
the undying), “this space still remains infinite, and more parts could be taken away from it without the 
concept of the soul growing in the least and being affirmatively determined” (A72-73/B98). That is, 
though subtracted from an infinite totality of things (both dying and undying things), the domain of 
undying things within which the soul has been placed is sufficiently indeterminate as to still count as 
infinite. The predicate’s denotation is so vast as to be essentially empty, only conveying the minimum 
amount of information: therein lies the negative component of the infinite judgment, for what is 
asserted about the subject is only what it is not. Indeed, Kant says you could form further infinite 
judgments about the soul (that it is irrational say, or immaterial), and the concept would retain the same 
level of indeterminacy – it would not ‘grow’ at all. Thus in Kant’s words, the “infinite judgment is merely 
limiting with regard to the content of cognition in general” (A73/B98). 
 What are we to make of Kant’s description of infinite judgments? Clearly their status as separate 
from affirmative and negative judgments is problematic. Remember: “in affirmatives the property 
expressed by the predicate is attributed to certain objects, whereas in negatives the property is denied 
of them.”178 According to one perspective then, an infinite judgment is indistinguishable from an 
affirmative: both assert a positive relationship between subject and predicate. Formally speaking, ‘the 
soul is non-mortal’ does the same job as the affirmative ‘the example is tedious’. Indeed, this is precisely 
the reason why Kant admits infinite judgments shouldn’t strictly be included in general logic! Moreover, 
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if the former could be said to convey something differently to the latter, it does so on the basis of a 
negative predicate – but then why isn’t an affirmative proposition with a negative subject also an 
instance of an infinite judgment, e.g. ‘unwelcome guests are tiring’?179 That said, there seems to be an 
equal argument for the subsumption of infinite judgments into negatives. After all, whether one says 
‘the soul is non-mortal’ or ‘the soul isn’t mortal’, the meaning one conveys in either case is that a certain 
object called the soul does not belong to the class of objects which are mortal. Bennett says that the 
distinction is “uncharacteristic of Kant,” insofar as infinite and negative judgments “do the same work in 
almost the same way” and only “differ in a minor verbal detail.”180 Given that both sides proffer 
persuasive arguments, perhaps it’s understandable that Kant held infinite judgments to be something 
separate from (though overlapping with) both affirmatives and negatives. And in particular, Mark Siebel 
makes one cogent argument for the differentiation of infinite and negative judgments, pace Bennett. 
Taking his cue from C. S. Pierce, Siebel claims that Kant abided by the logic of what one would today call 
‘existential import’, which is to say the stance that affirmatives imply the existence of their subjects 
while negatives do not.181 Indeed Siebel affirms that this thesis –“affirmatives are false if the subject is 
empty while negatives are true in this case”182  – is traceable as far back as William of Ockham’s 
Summae logicae (c. 1323). If one understands Kant in this light, then the Kantian infinite judgment 
‘dragons are immortal’ is false whereas the negative judgment ‘dragons aren’t mortal’ is true, insofar as 
the former implies that dragons exist whereas the latter does not. Thus infinite judgments can be said to 
convey different information than negatives. 
Either way, this is not our focus. Our focus is on the meaning that attaches to Kant’s use of the 
concept of infinity. Our position is that the concept’s use amounts to a claim about indefinite 
applicability: a determinate concept could be applied to a potentially limitlessness number of cases. 
Let’s spell this out. An infinite judgment is so called because, according to Kant, the predicate positions 
the subject into an infinite category, e.g. the category of non-mortal things. As before, our question is in 
what sense is this category infinite? We have three points to consider. First of all, Kant’s vocabulary 
points us in the direction that by infinite he means indefinitely extendable. As we quoted above, he 
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emphasises that the totality of dying and undying things (which is greater than the domain of undying 
things specified by the infinite judgment) has an infinite extension only in the sense that it is “possible.” 
This word is repeated with respect to the extension of the domains of dying and undying things taken 
separately: “that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain of possible beings, but that 
which is undying the other.” Secondly, to accord to the negative predicate an actual infinite extension – 
whatever that might mean – would lead to a specific absurdity. For Kant asserts that it’s the form of the 
judgment that necessarily results in an infinite extension: that is, Kant’s argument is that ‘S is non-P’ 
positions S into an infinite domain. As Lovejoy notes, however: 
If I divide mankind dichotomously into the two classes of those over two feet tall, and those not over 
two feet tall – or all beings into temporal and non-temporal – there is no reason to think that the 
extension of my negative genus is in either case greater than that of its positive counterpart.183  
As a result, Lovejoy concludes that it’s only inasmuch as “their possible extension goes, both genera 
seem to be infinite, or indefinite.”184 Thirdly, it must be noted that Kant’s reference to infinity in the 
context of the table does not begin with the infinite judgment. He initially refers to the concept of 
infinity apropos judgments of Quantity. Kant writes that if we compare singular judgments “with a 
generally valid one” – by which he means a universal judgment – “then the former relates to the latter 
as unity relates to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the latter” (A71/B97). That 
is, the concept of infinity is associated with universal judgments because they pertain in every case, or 
put alternately, they pertain to a totality of identical cases. I say ‘associated’ and not ‘equated’, because 
clearly Kant does not accord to universal judgments the rubric of infinity – this he saves for cases 
whereby a negative is affirmed, or put alternately, where a subject is placed into a limited class that is 
nevertheless indefinitely extended. Hence Kant explicitly equates the concept of infinity in the context 
of the forms of judgment with the indeterminate, unlimited and indefinite. Kant’s use of the term clearly 
belongs to the cluster of concepts surrounding Moore’s notion of endless infinity. That said, let’s 
proceed to the next instance of Kant’s use of the term. 
Conceptual Infinity (the Aesthetic) 
The nonconceptualists are eager to discuss Kant’s claim in the Aesthetic concerning the infinity of space 
(and time). However Kant applies the concept of infinity to two types of representation in order to make 
his point: he contrasts the infinity of the manifold of space and time with the infinity of concepts. We will 
                                                          




contemplate the latter in the hope that it will illuminate the former, and as we do so we will clarify a 
small ambiguity that arises in the commentary on this point. Remember: while Kant stipulates that “no 
concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations within itself,” he 
does allow one to think “of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of 
different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under itself” 
(A25/B40). To put this another way, Kant denies a concept can hold an infinite set of representations, 
but permits somehow that an infinite set can fall under a concept. Clearly, in order to discuss the 
viability of the latter we must exempt ourselves from, for the time being, the usual difficulties that arise 
when contemplating an infinite task (like the law of entropy).185 Our purpose is to speak only of the 
logical mechanism that determines a concept’s relation to an infinite set of representations in the 
positive sense. Using Allison’s phrase, we will describe the latter as the concept’s capacity for 
“extensional ordering,”186 which is to say that Kant allows for a concept to have an infinite extensional 
order.  
Two conceptions of what the infinity of the extensional order consists in have arisen in the 
secondary literature. On the one hand, according to Allison, a concept can have “an infinite or, better, 
an indefinite number of concepts falling under it.”187 For instance, the concept ‘object’ can divided into 
the subordinate concepts ‘material object’ and ‘mental object’, the latter of which can be divided into 
‘psychological object’, ‘spiritual object’ or ‘mathematical object’, and the latter of which can again be 
divided into ‘set’, ‘equation’, ‘number’, ‘function’, and so on. Allison’s point is just that “the search for 
subordinate concepts can be pursued ad infinitum”188 – one concept can lead to an indefinite number of 
other concepts. On the other hand, Sebastian Gardner interprets the idea that a concept has an infinite 
extensional order to mean that it has “an infinite number of possible instances.”189 Lorne Falkenstein, 
for whom Kant’s claim is that a concept “can have an infinite number of instances and, in this sense, 
contain an infinity under itself,” mirrors Gardner.190 According to the latter interpretation, a concept 
possesses an infinite extensional order only insofar as it can apply to an infinite number of objects. To 
sharpen the point of this analysis, we can say that Allison takes infinite extensional ordering to pertain 
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between concepts, whereas Gardner-Falkenstein take infinite extensional ordering to pertain between a 
concept and its objects.  
To our mind, the latter is superior to the former conception of extensional ordering. Though this 
is a detour, let’s spend a moment unpacking why. For Allison, the manner in which a subordinate 
concept comes to be related to a general concept in extensional ordering is “by adding differentia.”191 
Using his examples, ‘animal’ and ‘vegetable’ are thus subordinate to the concept ‘animate body’, which 
along with ‘inanimate body’ is in turn subordinate to the concept ‘physical body’. We can see this 
relationship visualised in the following figure: 
 
 
The extensional ordering of the concept is contrasted by Allison with its intensional ordering, and the 
latter is correlated with what a concept contains. Thus while Kant permits infinite extensional ordering, 
he explicitly rejects infinite intensional ordering. Now what is this intensional ordering? According to 
Allison, intensional “ordering is the reverse of extensional ordering, since the lower or more specific 
concepts contain the higher or more general ones within themselves.”192 That is to say, the concept of 
‘animal’ contains ‘animate body’, which in turn contains ‘physical body’ in an intensional order. “In 
short, there is an inverse correlation between the extension and the intension of a concept. The smaller 
the extension, the richer the intension, and vice versa.”193 We can see this relationship visualised in the 
following figure: 
                                                          










As one can see, the three boxes demonstrate the difference between an intensionally rich concept (far 
right) and an intensionally bare concept (far left). According to Allison’s analysis, Kant’s last argument 
turns upon the denial that a concept can be infinitely rich in its intensional order: “A concept cannot 
have an infinitely rich intension… because such a ‘concept’ would lose its discursive character.”194 Thus 
Allison comes to the same conclusion as Gardner and Falkenstein, which aligns with Kant’s initial edict 
that a concept cannot contain “an infinite set of representations within itself.”  The obstacle to 
accepting Allison’s interpretation is this: the relation between a general concept and its subordinate 
concepts is too similar to the relation between a concept and its significations, inasmuch as it is precisely 
Kant’s point that the latter cannot be infinite. To spell this out, one must recognise that by construing 
extensional ordering in terms of an intra-conceptual relation (i.e. the relation between general and 
subordinate concepts), Allison forces himself into a position whereby the concept’s permitted 
relationship with limitlessness (i.e. extension) is the inverse of the concept’s prohibited relationship with 
limitlessness (i.e. intension). In Gardner and Falkenstein’s model, extensional ordering is quite separate 
from intensional ordering. By their account, the latter only determines what can count as a candidate 
for the application of the former. We can see the relationship between the two visualised in the 
following figures, where the first describes the intensional order and the second describes the 
extensional order: 
 







On the Gardner-Falkenstein account, the intensional order merely provides guidance for the extensional 
order. The components of a concept (what is contained in it) are significations, which in turn act as 
criteria to be fulfilled in order for the objects (what fall under the concept) to have the concept applied 
to them. In this interpretation, the magnitude of the intensional set has nothing to do with the 
magnitude of the extensional set, and it is precisely in this sense that Allison’s model invites calamity. 
For on Allison’s account the intensional and extensional orders directly determine one another. Insofar 
as they are in direct relation, the consequence of allowing infinity into one order is tantamount to 
allowing into the other. The fact that the direct relation is inverted matters little when it comes to an 
infinite magnitude: dividing one by infinity only produces infinity again. Thus the Gardner-Falkenstein 
account is superior to Allison’s.  
Arbitration complete, it is clear from our analyses that – whichever interpretation one promotes 
– the kind of infinity that Kant attributes to conceptuality belongs to the cluster of concepts surrounding 
Moore’s notion of endless infinity. That is, whether one conceives of a concept’s extensional magnitude 
in terms of its applicability to objects which meet the criteria established by its significations (Gardner-
Falkenstein), or in terms of the set of subordinate concepts from which it is differentiated (Allison), the 
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extensional order of a concept is indefinitely extended, such that the set to which the concept (of 
infinity) is applied is only potentially infinite. Allison describes its infinity as ‘indefinite’, and states that 
Kant is only committed “to the view that the search for subordinate concepts can be pursued ad 
infinitum,” which is equivalent to saying without end.195 Gardner and Falkenstein are no less clear, as its 
unimaginable that the range of a concept’s applicability to objects is anything other than potentially 
infinite. If that weren’t enough to carry the argument, Kant says himself that the concept’s extensional 
order pertains to “an infinite set of different possible representations” (B40). 
An Infinite Whole 
At the close of our textual analyses, what have we revealed? The conclusion we draw is that, in the 
opening chapters of the Critique, Kant uses the word ‘infinity’ in only one sense: to denote endlessness. 
That is, for every unit populating the collection to which he appends this term, his contention is that 
another unit can be found – for every object that fulfils the criteria necessary to have the concept of 
‘table’ applied to it, another object that matches those criteria is also possible, and for every subject 
that is predicable as non-mortal, another subject could also be so predicated. The idea that these 
‘collections’, insofar as they are infinite, could be in some sense total or whole is meaningless. And yet, 
when Kant applies the same concept to the forms of our sensible intuition, McLear insists that Kant is 
stating we are given infinite spatio-temporal wholes. From a purely textual viewpoint, this seems 
unreasonable. 
 In the face of the above, one imagines that McLear would substantiate his holistic take on the 
spatio-temporal infinite by referring to the PWA. The terms of this latter argument revolve around the 
distinction between parts and wholes, and the different ways in which the understanding and sensibility 
organise these elements. One must remember that Kant stipulates that, in the case of concepts, the 
parts build up to a whole, whereas in the case of spatial or temporal intuitions, the parts are limitations 
of the whole. It is not an exaggeration to say that this distinction stands at the heart of McLear’s 
nonconceptualist position. But let us remind ourselves one last time of what Kant’s argument in the 
Metaphysical Exposition is:  
one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only 
parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-
encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are 
only thought in it. It is essentially single… (A25/B39). 
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Now isn’t there another way of viewing the content of this passage than the one traditionally assumed? 
Earlier on we described the PWA as promoting a mereological distinction, for mereology just is the study 
of part-whole relationships. This is certainly the interpretation that Colin McLear (and many others) give 
to Kant’s passage, and it seems at first to be entirely apt. However, once a claim to part-hood has been 
made, a corollary claim upon the presence of a whole is now incumbent, and it is precisely the claim to 
the wholeness of space which presents us with a difficulty. As Giorgio Lando asserts in his Mereology: A 
Philosophical Introduction (2017), “Parthood is a binary relation: it is not a property had by a single 
thing. When I make a parthood claim, I indicate an x that is the part (the relatum) and a y that is the 
whole (the second relatum).”196 Thus rather than conceive of space mereologically, why don’t we take 
Kant’s passage logically? That is, the point that Kant’s ‘it is essentially single’ remark makes is simply 
that, for every instance of what one might call ‘local space’ (a bedroom, for example), the qualities that 
make it space – its spatial character – are identical to any other instance. That is, whether one should 
walk into a bathroom, up a mountain, or swim in the ocean, every location exhibits the same spatial 
characteristics. Divested of all the particularities that cling to an intuition, whether it be the 
temperature, size or colour of the space, its character as spatial (its being-space) never changes. After 
all, ‘space’ is not the same as ‘size’. A toy-car and a real car are very different sizes, but is one any less 
spatial than the other? The same rule applies to moments in time: though instants proliferate and 
include within their proliferation the greatest diversity of events imaginable, their temporal character 
doesn’t change. One moment is identical to the next, when considered exclusively from the point of 
view of their temporality, just as one location is identical to the next, when considered exclusively from 
the point of view of their spatiality. Given this logical relation of identity between moments in time or 
regions in space, what need has one for imagining a whole? If one wanted to translate this point into a 
mereological language (which would be disingenuous, given our aversion to the whole), Kant’s claim 
amounts to the assertion that, unlike concepts where the parts are distinct from one another (different 
conceptual characters), the parts in space and time are all the same. Of course there is a cumulative 
effect: the more ‘spaces’ I encounter, the more ‘space’ I am aware of. But there is nothing inherent in 
this cumulative effect that leads me to claim by necessity that I am given a transcendental totality from 
which all pieces, intuited or not, are gathered. Thus, if one treats Kant’s distinction between concepts 
and intuitions logically rather than mereologically, and if one takes Kant’s application of the term 
‘infinite’ to be consistent across the opening chapters of the Critique, the anxiety expressed by McLear 
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disappears. Kant does not allow for an infinite spatial or temporal whole given as pure intuition. Rather, 
spatio-temporality is differentiated from conceptuality by emphasising its internal identity over its 
internal distinctiveness, and then it is affirmed that, though our encounter will always involve 
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P – Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics, translated and edited by Gary Hatfield. 
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